EXPLICITLY AWARE OF CONFLICT:  CHALLENGING THE IMPLICIT CONFLICT DETECTION INTERPRETATION  OF THE BASE-RATE NEGLECT TASK by Newman, Ian
  
 
 
EXPLICITLY AWARE OF CONFLICT:  
CHALLENGING THE IMPLICIT CONFLICT DETECTION INTERPRETATION  
OF THE BASE-RATE NEGLECT TASK 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Arts 
In the Department of Psychology 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
By 
 
 
IAN NEWMAN 
 
 
 
 Copyright Ian Randal Newman, September, 2017. All rights reserved. 
 
i 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis/dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master’s 
degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may 
make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis 
in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or 
professors who supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or 
the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or 
publication or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without 
my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the 
University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my 
thesis. 
 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
Reference in this thesis/dissertation to any specific commercial products, process, or service by 
trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, 
recommendation, or favoring by the University of Saskatchewan.  The views and opinions of the 
author expressed herein do not state or reflect those of the University of Saskatchewan, and shall 
not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis/dissertation in 
whole or part should be addressed to: 
 
 
  
 College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 105 Administration Place 
 Saskatoon, Saskatchewan  S7N 5A2 
 Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 ABSTRACT 
Conflict reasoning problems cue two competing responses to the problem, requiring the reasoner 
to resolve the conflict; non-conflict problems cue the same response.  The central claim of the 
conflict detection literature is that conflict is detected implicitly without explicit awareness.  The 
goal of this research is to test the hypothesis that reasoners are explicitly aware of the conflict 
with the base-rate reasoning task.  Base-rate neglect is the tendency to undervalue base-rate 
ratios in favour of stereotypical personality descriptions.  Conflict is studied with the base-rate 
task by pitting probabilistic information (the ratio) against believable information (the 
stereotype); performance is measured on conflict problems relative to non-conflict problems.  In 
this research, the extremity of the base-rate ratios was manipulated and a neutral problem 
condition was included.  Behavioural measures of confidence ratings, response times, and eye-
gaze fixation times were collected.  Retrospective self-reports were taken regarding awareness of 
conflict in the problems and conflict resolution strategy.  In two experiments, there was 
compelling evidence that reasoners are more explicitly aware of conflict than previously 
assumed, that base-rate neglect is a function of conflict resolution strategy, and that the presumed 
indices of conflict detection index more than detection, namely, processes of conflict resolution 
and recognition of coherent information.  This evidence provides a strong challenge to the 
predominant conflict-detection interpretation. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Many situations cue multiple, competing responses to a problem.  The goal of conflict 
detection research is to understand what cues a reasoner to avoid biased thinking and engage in 
analytic thinking.  It is believed that the primary cues for analytic thought are detection of 
conflict (De Neys, 2014; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) and affective metacognitive 
states (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; Thompson, Prowse-Turner, & Pennycook, 2011; 
Thompson et al., 2013).  The key questions for researchers are whether reasoners detect the fact 
that there are competing responses and whether reasoners are aware of the conflict between said 
responses.  Current theories stress that detection of competing responses is a cognitively implicit 
process (De Neys, 2014; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Pennycook et al., 2015) experienced only as 
an affective “gut-feeling” without any explicit awareness (De Neys, 2014).   
The purpose of this research is to test the central claims of the conflict-detection 
interpretation (De Neys, 2012; 2014): reasoners implicitly detect but are explicitly unaware of 
conflicting responses and that the indices of conflict detection (e.g., confidence reports, response 
times, eye-gaze fixation times) index detection per se.  The alternative interpretation proposed 
here is that reasoners are explicitly aware of the conflict and that the indices of conflict detection 
index more than detection, namely, cognitive factors of conflict resolution and monitoring of 
information coherence (the consistency of the information, assessed intuitively; Topolinski, 
2011), hereafter referred to as the coherence-resolution interpretation.  The coherence-resolution 
interpretation provides a strong challenge to the predominant conflict-detection interpretation. 
1.1. Base-Rate Neglect 
Conflict reasoning problems present reasoners with two inconsistent sources of 
information intended to cue two competing responses.  These problems typically pit the rules of 
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logic and/or probability against the person’s a priori beliefs, where the normatively correct 
response is to apply logical or probabilistic rules.  As a control, in non-conflict problems both 
pieces of information cue the same response. 
The base-rate neglect phenomenon is the tendency to undervalue statistical information 
in favour of a personality description when estimating the probability of category membership 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  The base-rate neglect reasoning 
task is frequently used to study conflict detection.  The task involves estimating the probability 
of category membership based on the information provided in each problem: the category base-
rate ratio and a stereotypical personality description, e.g., 
In a study, 1000 people were tested. Jack is a randomly chosen participant of this study. 
Among the participants there were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers. Jack is 36 years old. He 
is not married and is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading 
science fiction and writing computer programs. What is the probability that Jack is an 
engineer? 
The reasoner is asked to estimate the likelihood that an individual (e.g., Jack) belongs to one of 
the two categories (e.g., engineer) given the probabilistic information and the stereotypical 
personality description (e.g., this person in question closely matches the stereotype of an 
engineer).  The probability and description can suggest two competing responses (conflict, as 
above) or one consistent response (non-conflict).   
Probability estimates for conflict problems are typically further from the base-rate 
probability than responses for non-conflict problems (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Presumably, this occurs because people tend to 
focus on the personality descriptions and ignore or minimize the base-rate ratios on conflict 
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problems (Barbey & Sloman, 2007).  Conflict is removed from the problems by reversing the 
base-rate ratio values (e.g., 5 engineers and 995 lawyers is changed to 995 engineers and 5 
lawyers).   
1.2. Conflict Detection 
 Reasoners consistently appear to neglect the base-rate ratios for conflict problems when 
estimating probabilities but there is evidence that they do not completely ignore the ratios.  
Conflict detection studies attempt to determine if reasoners are sensitive to the conflict between 
competing responses that are inconsistent with one another, such as the stereotype and base-rate 
responses in the above example (De Neys, 2014).  Sensitivity to conflict is operationalized as 
performance on conflict problems relative to non-conflict problems.  Even when a reasoner’s 
probability estimates suggest that the base-rate was neglected, other elements of their 
performance indicate that they were, on some level, sensitive to the conflict between the base-
rate ratio and the stereotype. 
There is considerable evidence that reasoners display myriad behavioural indicators of 
sensitivity to conflict even when their responses do not (see De Neys, 2014 for a review).  
Relative to non-conflict problems, on conflict problems, reasoners typically display longer 
response times (Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Thompson et al., 2011), 
lower confidence (Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014; Thompson & Johnson, 
2014; Thompson et al., 2011), increased autonomic arousal (De Neys, Moyens, & 
Vansteenwegen, 2010), and increased visual attention on the relevant, conflicting problem 
information (Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006).  Moreover, this has been found on a variety 
of reasoning tasks: base-rate neglect (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), conjunction fallacy (De Neys, 
Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011), ratio-bias (Mevel et al., 2015), syllogistic reasoning (Thompson & 
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Johnson, 2014), and the cognitive reflection test (De Neys & Feremans, 2012).  Reasoners also 
display better recall (on surprise recall tasks) for base-rate ratios from conflict problems than 
from non-conflict problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Franssens & De Neys, 2009), 
suggesting that reasoners notice the base-rate ratios that conflict with the personality 
descriptions.   
As an index of conflict detection, visual attention has been relatively underutilized in 
reasoning research.  Using a belief-bias task, Ball, Philips, Wade, and Quayle (2006) found that 
inspection time increased on problem premises for conflict problems relative to non-conflict 
problems, suggesting that the response to conflict is to review the conflicting information.  De 
Neys and Glumicic (2008) applied a paradigm where base-rate ratios were visible while a button 
was pressed but hidden otherwise.  In their task, reasoners reviewed the base-rate ratios more for 
conflict trials than non-conflict trials.  To date, conventional eye-tracking measures have not 
been applied to a base-rate reasoning task. 
The crucial evidence here is that these behavioural measures are found independent of 
performance on the task itself: reasoners that give responses consistent with the stereotype 
nonetheless display these conflict detection effects (Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys, 2012; 
Morsanyi & Handley, 2012).  The prevailing conflict-detection interpretation is that these 
measures index conflict detection, detection is an implicit process (De Neys, 2012; Pennycook et 
al., 2015), and reasoners are unaware of the conflict at an explicit level (De Neys, 2014).  De 
Neys (2014) contends that conflict gives rise to arousal, which in turn is noticed by reasoners; 
the nature of the conflict is not explicitly understood beyond a “gut-feeling” (De Neys et al., 
2010).  The affective experience is merely a signal to question one’s initial response (De Neys, 
2012, Thompson et al., 2011).   
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The conflict-detection interpretation rests on the assumption that if a reasoner gives the 
normatively incorrect response to a problem, they must have been unaware of the conflict.  
Otherwise, they would have given the statistically correct response.  Thus, they must have 
processed the conflicting information at an implicit level (eliciting the aforementioned 
behavioural responses) but because they gave the incorrect response, the conflict was not 
processed at an explicit level of awareness.  The source of the conflict is thought not to be 
accessible to the reasoner.  To date, this assumption has not been tested. 
1.3. Conflict Resolution 
The conflict-detection interpretation relies on the assumption that when one gives a non-
normative response to a reasoning problem, it is indicative of a reasoning failure (De Neys, 2014, 
Pennycook et al., 2015).  It is assumed that when a response other than the normatively correct 
one is given, it results either from (a) a failure to detect the conflict or (b) successful implicit 
detection but a failure to calculate the correct response (from the above example, 0.5% chance 
that Jack is an engineer; Pennycook et al., 2015).  As argued below, it is not necessary to assume 
that conflict detection is implicit. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that an incorrect response is indicative of a reasoning 
strategy (Pennycook & Thompson, 2012), intention (e.g., rationalization of the statistically 
improbable response; Pennycook et al., 2015), or a function of relative weighting of information.  
In other words, reasoners could deliberately choose the personality description over the base-rate 
ratio.  For example, on a base-rate problem, a reasoner might disregard the probability because 
he felt his personal experience with the information provided by the stereotype was more reliable 
to reach a solution.  In this case, one might well be aware of the probabilistic answer and aware 
of the conflict but ultimately select a non-normative response.  There is no need to assume that 
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conflict detection is implicit nor that an incorrect answer indicates the absence of awareness.  
The nature of the reasoning process may hinge less on the implicit detection of conflict and more 
on the explicit resolution of conflict based on subjective weighting of information in the 
problem.  Thus, reasoners would be generally aware of conflict at an explicit level. 
Pennycook and Thompson (2012) argued that reasoners strategically choose which 
source of information on which to base their responses.  Their interpretation was that the base-
rate neglect phenomenon arises when the combination of two strategies (reliance on ratios or 
reliance on descriptions) are averaged in group level analyses.  Under this interpretation, it is 
argued that base-rate neglect occurs because generally, those who apply a strategy of reliance on 
the personality description are more numerous (Newman, Gibb, & Thompson, 2017; Pennycook 
& Thompson, 2012).  This interpretation is consistent with an extensive line of research that 
indicates there is a significant minority of reasoners who demonstrate frequently successful 
normative reasoning: giving responses consistent with the rules of logic and probability (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich & West, 2000; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011; Thompson & 
Johnson, 2014).  Essentially, base-rate neglect can be thought of as the proportion of conflict 
resolution strategies applied by reasoners; the majority demonstrate the phenomenon but a 
minority primarily do not. 
1.4. Indices of Conflict Detection, Coherence, and Resolution 
Conflict effects can be explained without the assumption of implicit conflict detection.  
There are several potential reasons why conflict problems elicit longer response times and lower 
confidence (and others; De Neys, 2014).  A reasoner that is aware of conflict must choose 
between two competing responses.  Merely selecting between two alternatives may increase time 
to respond compared to non-conflict problems that cue only one response.  Moreover, awareness 
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that there is more than one plausible response to the problem forces the reasoner to choose 
between them; any indecision or uncertainty regarding which to select could reduce confidence.  
The reasoner may second guess their choice and then rate their confidence as lower.   
There is reason to question whether the indices of conflict detection singularly index the 
implicit detection of conflict.  Measures such as self-reported confidence and response times may 
also index the resolution of conflict or monitoring of information coherence.  If these measures 
are sensitive to multiple cognitive factors, inferences regarding implicit detection of conflict are 
unwarranted.  For example, if reasoners display lower confidence on conflict problems, the 
source of the reduction in confidence is unclear; it could be caused by conflict detection, 
recognition of incoherence of information, the resolution of conflict, or a combination of these 
factors.  Similarly, one cannot infer that observable conflict effects across multiple behavioural 
measures indicate that these measures all reflect the same cognitive conflict detection process.  It 
is assumed that conflict effects on these behavioural measures reflect the same underlying 
cognitive processes (De Neys, 2014); as argued below, that assumption may also be 
unwarranted. 
1.5. Explicit Awareness of Conflict 
  Reasoners may be more explicitly aware of conflict than previously believed.  To test 
that hypothesis, retrospective self-report measures of conflict awareness and conflict resolution 
strategy provide the first attempt to create indices of explicit conflict awareness that can be used 
alongside the presumed indices of conflict detection.  Under the conflict-detection interpretation, 
implicit and explicit measures should not necessarily correlate with one another because 
detection is believed to be processed implicitly; the reasoner is not explicitly aware of the 
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conflict.  Thus, how a reasoner reports their own explicit awareness would not necessarily be 
associated with their behaviour that indicates conflict was implicitly detected.   
Alternatively, the coherence-resolution interpretation would predict that implicit and 
explicit measures will correlate with each other because the presumed indices of conflict 
detection are also measures of conflict resolution processes.  Under this interpretation, reasoners 
are more explicitly aware than previously believed; therefore, reports of awareness will be 
related to behavioural reactions to conflict.  The rationale is that these measures are all indexing 
the same cognitive construct, namely, relative awareness of conflict. 
In the present research, self-reports were used to assess explicit awareness of conflict.  
The validity of self-report data in problem-solving research has been challenged; the reports are 
frequently inaccurate because they require introspective inferences about covert cognitive 
processes (Cohen, 1987; Ericsson & Simon, 1987).  In that case, what are the conditions that 
allow for reliable self-reports of cognitive processes (Taylor & Dionne, 2000)?  Self-reports 
access the content of consciousness, but not the cognitive processes that never reach 
consciousness (Wilson, 1994).  Also, there is a general consensus that retrospective protocols are 
subject to some forgetting (Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989).  However, this has been found to 
be a greater concern for low-level cognitive processes (e.g., basic perceptual processing) than 
higher-order processes (e.g., strategy use; Russo et al., 1989).  Questionnaires should focus on 
“what” rather than “why” queries, a matter-of-fact approach to the questions (instead of 
evaluative), and opportunities for clarification from the respondents; these conditions allow for 
collection of valid and reliable retrospective report data (Taylor & Dionne, 2000).  These 
prescriptions were followed here to maximize the validity of the self-report measures: matter-of-
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fact questions regarding higher-order cognitive processes with opportunity for clarification, 
wherever possible. 
Retrospective self-report protocols appear to be an adequate method of assessing higher-
order cognitive processes.  Two measures of explicit awareness were gathered: the strategy 
adopted to resolve conflict (relying on the probabilistic information or relying on the believable 
information) and the explicit awareness of conflict.  One option was to query reasoners on 
strategy and awareness on a per-problem basis.  The concern was the reactivity of the questions, 
alerting the reasoner of the possibility of conflict in the coming problems and potentially 
influencing their performance on subsequent trials during the task (e.g., increased response 
times; Russo et al., 1989).  Therefore, a retrospective self-report at the end of the experiment was 
the most appropriate measure to test the hypotheses regarding explicit awareness of conflict and 
conflict resolution strategies.  Additionally, strategy reports can be verified by the behavioural 
data: the behavioural responses should map sensibly onto the reported strategies applied by 
reasoners. 
1.6. Objectives 
 The main hypotheses of the present research were (a) that reasoners are explicitly aware 
of conflict in the reasoning problems they solve, (b) the presumed indices of conflict detection 
are sensitive to other cognitive processes that elicit similar behavioural responses as conflict 
detection, and (c) base-rate neglect is explained by individual differences in conflict resolution 
strategies.  To test these hypotheses, two experiments were conducted using the base-rate task.  
In Experiment 1, novel self-report measures were used to assess explicit awareness of conflict; 
these measures have not been used in conflict detection research.  A novel, retrospective self-
report was also used to determine reasoning strategy and was corroborated with behavioural 
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measures of probability estimates, confidence reports, response times, and eye-gaze fixation 
times.  Eye-tracking measures have not been used in base-rate neglect research, to date.  Another 
version of non-conflict problems (i.e., neutral problems, see below) were included to test the 
sensitivity of the behavioural indices to cognitive factors unrelated to conflict detection.  In 
Experiment 2, the explicit awareness and strategy self-reports were again used alongside two 
attempts to experimentally manipulate explicit awareness.  The first was an intervention 
questionnaire aimed at increasing awareness by alerting reasoners to the conflict in the problems.  
The second was a concurrent spatial memory task intended to load working-memory and reduce 
the ability to explicitly (but not implicitly) detect the conflict in the problems. 
Chapter 2. Experiment 1 
Reasoners performed a base-rate task using the two-response paradigm (see below; 
Thompson et al., 2011); the format of this task closely matched the base-rate task used by 
Newman et al., (2017).  Probability estimates, response times, and confidence ratings were 
collected for each problem.  Additionally, eye-gaze fixation times were measured for two areas 
of interest (AOI) in the problem text presented to reasoners: the area surrounding the base-rate 
ratio and the area surrounding the personality description.  Retrospective self-reports were also 
taken at the end of the task, assessing explicit awareness of conflict and the strategy adopted to 
solve the preceding problems. 
2.1. Neutral Personality Descriptions 
Congruency between description and base-rate ratio was manipulated.  The description 
and base-rate suggested one consistent response (congruent), competing, inconsistent responses 
(incongruent), or contained an uninformative personality description (neutral).  De Neys and 
Glumicic (2008) altered personality descriptions in their base-rate task to include neutral control 
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problems; for these problems, the personality descriptions offered uninformative details (e.g., 
height, eye-colour, city of residence instead of a stereotype) regarding category membership.  
Probability estimates on neutral base-rate problems have been found to be further from the base-
rate probability than non-conflict problems yet closer to the base-rate probability than conflict 
problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Newman et al., 2017; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; 
Thompson et al., 2011). 
Neutral problems do not contain conflicting information.  If the difference in behavioural 
responses (e.g., lower confidence, longer response times, longer fixation times) between conflict 
and non-conflict problems were genuine indicators of conflict detection, then the effect of 
conflict would be more pronounced for conflict problems than for neutral problems.  
Alternatively, previous research has found that neutral problems are associated with lower 
confidence ratings than both congruent and incongruent problems that contain stereotypical 
personality descriptions (Thompson et al., 2011).  This evidence suggests that confidence is 
indexing other cognitive processes than conflict detection.  For example, because the personality 
descriptions in the neutral problems do not cue a believable response (De Neys & Glumicic, 
2008), reasoners may view the information in neutral problems as less coherent than congruent 
and incongruent problems because the description is not consistent with either category in the 
base-rate ratio.  Coherence is thought to elicit fluently generated responses and, in turn, higher 
confidence (Koriat, 2012; Thompson et al., 2011).  Thus, one explanation for low confidence for 
neutral problems is that the information is less coherent.  Additionally, neutral problems could 
evoke feelings of uncertainty, as the descriptions do not offer useful information to solve the 
problem, a potential source of reduced confidence and longer response times.  Therefore, if the 
presumed behavioural indicators of conflict detection are more pronounced for neutral problems 
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than for incongruent problems (Thompson et al., 2011), it indicates that there are cognitive 
factors, other than conflict detection, that elicit these responses in the base-rate task. 
2.2. Base-Rate Ratio Extremity 
The extremity of the base-rate ratios was also manipulated, using extreme (995:5), 
moderate (700:300), and balanced (510:490) ratios to vary the degree of conflict (Newman et al., 
2017; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015).  Newman, Gibb, and 
Thompson (2017), using the two-response paradigm (Thompson et al., 2011) found that 
probability estimates varied between base-rate ratio extremity conditions for neutral and non-
conflict problems, reflecting an awareness of differences in the base-rate probability.  On conflict 
trials, this difference only emerged for extreme ratios.  Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler 
(2015) also found that more responses consistent with the base-rate probability were given when 
base-rates were extreme compared to moderate.   
Varying the extremity of the base-rate ratios effectively varies the degree of conflict in 
the problems.  Conflict effects on confidence are typically found using extreme base-rates (De 
Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2014; Thompson et 
al., 2011).  The extremity manipulation also varies the coherence of the information in the 
problems.  In congruent, non-conflict problems, the personality description is more coherent with 
an extreme base-rate ratio than with a moderate or balanced ratio.  Thus, the difference between 
conflict and non-conflict problem confidence could reflect increased confidence when 
information is more coherent instead of decreased confidence when conflict is detected (or a 
combination of both).  If confidence is an index of conflict detection, then varying the base-rate 
ratio extremity would influence confidence on the incongruent conflict problems, but not on the 
non-conflict congruent and neutral problems.  On the other hand, if confidence indexes 
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coherence as well as conflict, then the effect of extremity would be detectable for congruent 
problems, as well. 
2.3. Visual Attention 
Eye-tracking has not been used to measure visual attention on the base-rate task.  Ball et 
al. (2006) found that conflict problems in a syllogistic reasoning task elicited more fixation time 
on the problem premises than non-conflict problems.  Under the conflict-detection interpretation, 
on conflict problems in the base-rate task, fixation times should increase (presumably to review 
the conflicting base-rate ratios and personality descriptions).  Alternatively, the inspection time 
of the uninformative personality descriptions could be the longest, possibly driven by uncertainty 
or attempts to resolve the inconsistency.   
Visual attention duration, response times, and confidence have all been presented as 
evidence for implicit conflict detection (De Neys, 2014), suggesting they all index the same 
underlying cognitive process.  Therefore, the conflict-detection interpretation would predict that 
on conflict problems, response times and fixation times would increase (presumably to review 
the conflicting base-rate ratios and personality descriptions) and confidence would decrease, 
relative to non-conflict problems.  Alternatively, if the response times, fixation times, and 
confidence patterns are not consistent with each other (e.g., response times are longest for 
conflict problems but confidence is lowest for neutral problems, not conflict problems) it would 
suggest that these measures index different cognitive factors.  For instance, confidence could be 
sensitive to the coherence of the information and response and fixation times sensitive to the 
resolution strategies adopted by the reasoners. 
Furthermore, if response times and visual attention index the resolution of conflict, then 
the reviewing of information on conflict trials should be a function of the resolution strategy 
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adopted by the reasoner.  Reasoners who favour probabilistic information would attend more to 
the base-rate ratios and less to the personality descriptions compared to those who favour 
believable personality descriptions, suggesting that measures of response time and fixation time 
index more than just a general response to implicitly detecting conflict, but also index conflict 
resolution processes. 
2.4. Hypotheses 
2.4.1. Base-rate neglect: probability estimates. 
The probability estimate measure serves to demonstrate the base-rate neglect 
phenomenon, which was expected to be replicated: probability estimates would be further from 
the base-rate probability for incongruent problems than congruent problems.  Probability 
estimates for neutral problems were also expected to replicate previous research (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; Newman et al., 2017; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2011): 
further from the base-rate probability than estimates for congruent problems but closer to the 
base-rate probability than estimates for incongruent problems.  The extremity effect was also 
expected to be replicated (Newman et al., 2017; Pennycook et al., 2015).  The effect of base-rate 
extremity was expected to manifest across all extremity conditions for neutral and congruent 
problems, but only in the extreme condition for incongruent problems. 
2.4.2. Hypothesis A: Behavioural indices are sensitive to multiple cognitive factors. 
2.4.2.1. Confidence. 
 The degree of conflict was manipulated in two ways: congruency and extremity.  The 
typical effect of conflict on confidence was expected to be replicated, where incongruent 
problems show lower confidence ratings than congruent problems.  Under the conflict-detection 
interpretation, confidence would be lower for incongruent (conflict) problems than for neutral 
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problems.  On the other hand, the coherence-resolution interpretation predicts that confidence for 
neutral problems would be lower than for incongruent problems, suggesting that confidence is 
indexing more than conflict detection, such as the relative coherence of the information 
presented. 
 The manipulation of base-rate extremity also varies the conflict in the problems.  In 
conflict problems, more extreme ratios present more conflict with the personality descriptions.  
For example, despite fitting the stereotypical description of an engineer, the probability Jack is 
an engineer is only 0.5% in extreme base-rate ratios but 30% in moderate base-rate ratios.  Thus, 
conflict between the personality description and base-rate ratio is highest for incongruent-
extreme problems; coherence between the personality description and base-rate ratio is highest 
for congruent-extreme problems.  Under the conflict-detection interpretation, the effect of 
conflict would be largest for the incongruent-extreme problems.  Conversely, if confidence is an 
index of coherence, the effect of extremity would also manifest for congruent problems.  Not 
only would the decrease in confidence be greatest when conflict is highest (i.e., incongruent-
extreme problems) but the increase in confidence would be greatest when coherence is highest 
(i.e., congruent-extreme). 
2.4.2.2. Response times. 
Under the conflict-detection interpretation, response time measures would be expected to 
mirror confidence measures: where confidence is decreased, response time is increased.  Both 
measures have been argued to index conflict detection, reflecting the same underlying cognitive 
process.  Therefore, response times for incongruent problems would be expected to be longer 
than response times for neutral problems; response times for congruent problems would be the 
shortest.   
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Under the coherence-resolution interpretation, the underlying cognitive processes 
indexed by confidence and response times may differ.  Conflict resolution, uncertainty, 
coherence, and weighing comparative strength of information may impact response times (and 
other similar measures) differently.  The prediction of the coherence-resolution interpretation is 
that the presence of neutral personality descriptions would evoke longer response times than for 
incongruent and congruent problems.  The rationale is analogous to the confidence measure.  The 
neutral descriptions provide little information upon which to base a decision, potentially 
generating feelings of uncertainty in reasoners and a more challenging conflict resolution 
decision, both of which would serve to increase response times.  Moreover, coherent information 
is thought to elicit fast, fluent processing (Koriat, 2012); the less coherent information in the 
neutral problems reduces fluency, presumably also increasing response times.   
2.4.2.3. Fixation times. 
 The conflict-detection interpretation would suggest that fixation times on both base-rates 
and personality descriptions would be longest for incongruent problems (converging with the 
response time data).  The problems with the highest degree of conflict are where the cue to 
reinspect the problem would be strongest.  On the other hand, if either response times or fixation 
times are longer for neutral problems than incongruent problems, it provides a challenge to the 
conflict-detection interpretation.  Fixation time as an index of conflict detection should be most 
sensitive when conflict is present.  Otherwise, fixation time indexes more than conflict detection 
and is not a trustworthy indicator of detection of conflict. 
2.4.3. Hypothesis B: Reasoners are explicitly aware of conflict. 
 Retrospective ratings of explicit awareness of conflict were a novel measure constructed 
for this experiment and have not been used in reasoning research to date.  Three questions were 
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created.  The first was a rating of awareness that there were two (or more) different answers 
available to the problems.  The second asked if the reasoner noticed the numbers and personality 
sketches suggested different responses.  The third posed the question of whether the reasoner 
ever felt the need to decide between two choices to select the best solution.  Responses were 
rated on a seven-point Likert scale. 
The expectation was that the three retrospective questions would correlate with one 
another, indicating that they assess the same underlying construct: explicit awareness of conflict.  
Furthermore, the a priori hypothesis was that reasoners are more explicitly aware of conflict than 
previously acknowledged by the conflict-detection interpretation.  Thus, it was predicted that 
reasoners would report relatively high awareness of conflict and that these measures would 
correlate with the hallmark behavioural indicators of conflict detection.  The correlation was 
expected because the behavioural indices and the self-report questions were predicted to both 
index detection of conflict, only differing on the dimension of conscious awareness.  In 
summary, the conflict-detection interpretation expects these measures would not correlate 
(detection does not reach awareness) and the coherence-resolution interpretation expects these 
measures would correlate (both index relative awareness of conflict). 
2.4.4. Hypothesis C: Base-rate neglect is a function of conflict resolution strategy. 
Strategy self-reports were expected to discriminate participants based on their approach 
to conflict resolution.  The question asked reasoners to report on their general approach to solve 
the problems: rely on the base-rate ratios, rely on the personality descriptions, or take a case-by-
case approach (open ended options were also available).  This question was a single retrospective 
query and a novel measure. 
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If the strategy report measure is a valid index of resolution strategy, then the effect of 
strategy would be evident across all the dependent measures in sensible patterns.  Preliminary 
predictions included (a) the group that reports relying on the base-rate ratios would give 
responses closest to the statistically correct base-rate probability, (b) the group that reports 
relying on the personality descriptions would be less confident with uninformative neutral 
descriptions, and (c) the group that reports taking a case-by-case approach would take the longest 
to respond and report the highest explicit awareness of conflict, as this group was expected to 
consider the base-rate ratios and personality descriptions more equally than the other two groups.  
Visual attention was also expected to be a function of strategy: the group that reports relying on 
the base-rate ratios would attend less to the personality descriptions than the other groups while 
the group that reports relying on the personality descriptions would attend less to the base-rate 
ratios than the other groups.  The coherence-resolution interpretation would predict that these 
strategies map sensibly on to the behavioural measures collected, indicating that that this 
retrospective question is a valid measure of resolution strategy and that (at least part of) what 
these measures index is the process of conflict resolution adopted by the reasoner. 
2.5. Method 
2.5.1. Participants. 
 One hundred twenty participants (74 female, 46 male, Mage=20.68 years) from the 
University of Saskatchewan took part in the study for partial course credit. 
2.5.2. Apparatus and stimuli. 
 The task was performed on a Microsoft Windows laptop computer with a 1600x900 
resolution display using the E-Prime Psychology Software Tools program (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).  Base-rate problems were presented as bitmap images of text on a black 
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background.  The problems described the ratio of membership for two categories (e.g., 995 
engineers, 5 lawyers) within a sample of 1000 people and a stereotypical personality description 
of one individual who had been randomly selected from the sample (e.g., Jack is somewhat 
introverted and spends his free time writing computer programs and reading science fiction).  
The base-rate ratio was always presented above the personality description.  Incongruent and 
congruent problems featured the same personality descriptions.  Neutral problems contained 
descriptions that were uninformative regarding category membership (e.g., description includes 
age, height, and eye colour; modified from De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). 
 Nine problems from each congruency condition were solved by each participant.  Three 
base-rate ratio extremities were also included: extreme (995:5), moderate (700:300), and 
balanced (510:490).  Participants solved nine problems from each base-rate extremity condition 
and values within ratios had three variations (e.g., 995:5, 996:4, 997:3).  Problem content was 
not repeated throughout the task for any participants.  Congruency and extremity were 
counterbalanced across participants.  The nine neutral problems were tested equally often in each 
base-rate extremity condition and were always neutral congruency.  The remaining 18 problems 
were tested equally often as congruent and incongruent; these were also tested equally often in 
each of the three base-rate extremity conditions.  For a full list of the base-rate problems, refer to 
Appendix A.  To facilitate the use of an eye-tracker, the text of the base-rate problems was 
adjusted to isolate the base-rate ratios and personality descriptions from the rest of the text: 
In a study, 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were: 
 
5 engineers 
995 lawyers 
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Jack is a randomly chosen participant of this study. 
 
Jack is 36 years old.  
He is not married and is somewhat introverted.  
He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction 
 and writing computer programs. 
 
What is the probability that Jack is a lawyer? 
 Self-report measures were taken for the general strategy applied to solve the problems 
(the full list of self-report questions is in Appendix B).  Five options were available:  
1. I mostly relied on the numbers 
2. I mostly paid attention to the personality sketches 
3. I guessed randomly 
4. I evaluated each problem on a case-by-case basis 
5. None of the above.  
Each response allowed for additional text to be provided by the participant to elaborate on their 
self-reported strategy.  Responses were also gathered for three questions meant to index relative 
awareness of conflict: 
1. Did you feel that there was two (or more) answers, which were quite different from 
one another, to some of the problems (Q1)? 
2. Did you notice that sometimes the personality sketch and the numbers suggested 
different responses (Q2)? 
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3. Did you ever feel torn between two choices and needed to decide which you felt was 
a better solution (Q3)? 
These responses were entered on a seven-point Likert scale (1 – Never, 7 – Always). 
Participants were seated approximately 55 to 65cm from the laptop computer screen on a 
stationary chair.  No chin rest was used.  The SMI RED-m remote eye-tracker (SensoMotoric 
Instruments; http://www.smivision.com) was used that allows for user mobility and minimizes 
intrusiveness (Mele & Federici, 2012).  The eye-tracker collected information regarding the 
frequency and order of eye-gaze fixations, frequency of gaze revisits to each area of interest, 
duration of each fixation, and pupil diameter.  The threshold for a fixation was 80ms of sustained 
gaze (or longer) on a single position on the screen with a fixation radius within 1° of dispersion 
(a dispersion threshold found to produce reliable, replicable results; Blignaut, 2009).  This 
dispersion criterion corresponded to approximately 0.96 to 1.13cm on the computer screen.  A 
conventional fixation threshold used in eye-tracking research that has been found to effectively 
discriminate fixations from other oculomotor activity (Manor & Gordon, 2003) and that has been 
used previously in reasoning research (Ball et al., 2006) is 100ms.  For the SMI BeGaze eye-
tracking software, the number of false fixations becomes large when the threshold is under 40ms 
but the distribution of fixation duration and fixation frequency is very similar for any threshold 
80ms and above (Holmqvist et al., 2011).  The SMI BeGaze software also uses 80ms as the 
default fixation threshold.  For these reasons, a fixation threshold of 80ms was considered 
acceptable for the purposes of this study. 
2.5.3. Procedure. 
Participants began the task with calibration of the eye-tracker, fixating their eye-gaze 
upon a target black circle on a grey background.  The circle would disappear and reappear 
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elsewhere on the screen once the eye-tracker recognized that the participant’s eye-gaze was 
fixated upon the target.  Calibration success was achieved when accuracy for x and y coordinates 
of the left and right eyes was within the accepted range of error: 1° of horizontal and vertical 
deviation from the target for each eye.  On calibration failure, up to five retries were available.  If 
all five calibration retries failed, the task would proceed without collection of eye-gaze data.   
 Base-rate problems were presented in a random order using the two-response paradigm 
(Thompson et al., 2011).  Participants provided probability estimates (on a scale from 0 to 100); 
they were instructed to respond intuitively with the first answer that came to mind for their initial 
response to each trial (Time 1) and to take their time and think carefully for the final response to 
each trial (Time 2).  Time 1 responses were also subject to time-pressure: problem text was white 
in colour and shifted to red after 11 seconds1.  The colour change served as a prompt to enter a 
response within 1 second; participants were instructed to give their response immediately after 
the shift in text colour occurred.  The purpose of this time pressure was to prevent participants 
from spending excessive amounts of time thinking about their Time 1 responses.  For each 
probability estimate entered, participants rated their confidence in the response on a nine-point 
Likert scale (1 – Guessing, 9 – Certain I'm Right).  Response times were also recorded for each 
probability estimate.  Probability estimates were recorded once the participant entered the value 
between 0 and 100 and pressed the Enter key.  The response time was recorded once the Enter 
key was pressed. 
The trial progression is displayed in Figure 2.1.  Each trial began with a central fixation 
cross presented for two seconds, followed by the base-rate problem for the Time 1 probability 
                                                             
1 Problems remained on screen until a response was entered, regardless of whether the deadline was met.  The 
deadline duration was previously determined to be challenging but afforded enough time for participants to read the 
problems in full (Thompson, Prowse-Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). 
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estimate.  After 11 seconds, if a probability estimate had not been entered, the text colour 
changed from white to red.  The problem in red text remained on screen until a response was 
provided.  After the Time 1 probability estimate was entered, the Time 1 confidence rating was 
recorded.  Next, the same base-rate problem was displayed for the Time 2 probability estimate to 
be recorded in free time; confidence in the Time 2 response was also rated by participants after 
the Time 2 probability estimate.    
 
 
Figure 2.1. Event sequence for Experiment 1 trials (with simplified text for legibility; see pages 
29-30 and Appendix A for format of the problem text).  
 
Upon completion of all 27 base-rate problems, the explicit awareness questions and 
strategy assessment were taken.  The strategy assessment was presented first.  Subsequently, the 
explicit awareness questions were presented.  These problems were presented sequentially for all 
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participants in a block with filler questions (e.g., recognition memory questions).  Completion of 
these self-report questions concluded the task.  The task instructions are in Appendix C. 
2.6. Results 
 The mean response time for Time 1 responses was 12.26 seconds.  Three participants had 
mean Time 1 response times that were greater than 2.5SD above the mean and were excluded 
from the analyses.  The nine participants that reported responding randomly and the four 
participants who did not provide strategy reports were also excluded from analyses, which left a 
total of 120 participants.  A 3 (Congruency[incongruent, congruent, neutral]) x 3 
(Extremity[extreme, moderate, balanced]) x 2 (Time[Time 1, Time 2]) repeated-measures 
ANOVA was computed on five dependent variables: probability estimates, confidence, response 
time, personality-sketch AOI fixation time and base-rate AOI fixation time.  Results significant 
at α = .05 are reported here.  Interactions are decomposed with pairwise comparisons using a 
Bonferroni correction.  Violations of the assumption of sphericity were calculated with 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity and corrected with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction.  The correction 
was only reported when the Greenhouse-Geisser and uncorrected p-values were different from 
each other. 
2.6.1. Analysis strategy 
 The following analyses are divided into four sections.  The first section is the analysis of 
probability estimates to determine that the base-rate neglect phenomenon was replicated.  The 
second section is a test of Hypothesis A that the presumed behavioural indices of conflict 
detection (confidence ratings, response times, and eye-gaze fixation times) are also sensitive to 
other cognitive factors, contrasting the predictions of the conflict-detection and coherence-
resolution interpretations.  The third section is a test of Hypothesis B that reasoners are more 
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explicitly aware of conflict than previously assumed by the conflict-detection interpretation.  The 
fourth and final section is a test of Hypothesis C that base-rate neglect is a function of conflict 
resolution strategy by determining if conflict resolution strategies map sensibly on to the 
probability estimates and other dependent measures taken in this experiment.    
2.6.2. Base-rate neglect. 
 The probability estimate data are plotted in Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3, and Figure 2.4.  For 
trials where the category probability to be estimated is the smaller value in the ratio (e.g., “What 
is the probability that Jack is a lawyer?” when the base-rate ratio has 5 lawyers and 995 
engineers), probability estimates were subtracted from 100 to rescale responses so that higher 
values represent answers closer to the base-rate probability.   
The base-rate neglect phenomenon was expected to be found: probability estimates for 
incongruent problems were predicted to be further from the base-rate probability than estimates 
for congruent problems.  The effect of congruency was significant, F(2,238)=330.33, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.74.  Probability estimates for incongruent trials (M=37.68, SD=13.83) were further from 
the base-rate probability than estimates for congruent trial (M=73.9, SD=9.96; t(119)=6.63, 
p<.001), replicating the standard base-rate neglect phenomenon.   
Based on previous research (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Newman et al., 2017), it was 
expected that probability estimates for neutral problems would be closer to the base-rate 
probability than estimates for incongruent problems but also further from the base-rate 
probability than estimates for congruent problems.  As expected, estimates for neutral problems 
(M=59.67, SD=9.2) were closer to the base-rate probability than incongruent estimates but 
further from the base-rate probability than congruent estimates (ts(119)>18.1, ps<.001). 
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The main effect of time, F(1,119)=34.14, p<.001, ηp2=0.22, was qualified by a Time x 
Congruency interaction, F(2,238)=18.98, p<.001, ηp2=0.14.  The same pattern of congruency 
was found at both Time 1 and Time 2: congruent estimates were closer to the base-rate 
probability than neutral estimates, which were closer to the base-rate probability than 
incongruent estimates (ts(119)>9.65, ps<.001).  The interaction occurred because, on average, 
estimates moved closer to the base-rate probability at Time 2 for congruent trials (+7.05; 
t(119)=8.46, p<.001) and neutral trials (+4.02; t(119)=5.16, p<.001), but not for incongruent 
trials (-1.02; t(119)=0.85, p=.399).  This result is consistent with previous research with the two-
response paradigm and the base-rate task that Time 2 probability estimates are closer to the 
statistically correct probability (Newman et al., 2017; Thompson et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Mean probability estimates for Experiment 1 as a function of Time x Congruency. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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 An effect of extremity was also predicted: probability estimates would be highest for 
extreme ratios and lowest for balanced ratios.  The extremity effect was observed, 
F(2,238)=91.06, p<.001, ηp2=0.43.  Probability estimates were highest when ratios were extreme 
(M=64.98, SD=13.14) and estimates for moderate ratios (M=55.87, SD=7.95) were also higher 
than for balanced ratios (M=50.35, SD=6.46; ts(119)>8.5, ps<.001), demonstrating that reasoners 
were sensitive to the differences in base-rate extremity. 
The effect of extremity also interacted with time, F(2,238)=11.83, p<.001, ηp2=0.09.  The 
same pattern of the effect of extremity was observable at both Time 1 and Time 2: extreme 
estimates were higher than moderate estimates, which in turn were higher than balanced 
estimates (ts(119)>4.82, ps<.001).  Overall, probability estimates were closer to the base-rate 
probability at Time 2 than at Time 1 for extreme base-rates (+6.9; t(119)=5.54, p<.001) and 
moderate base-rates (+2.16; t(119)=2.91, p=.004), but only marginally closer for balanced base-
rates (+1.06; t(119)=1.78, p=.077).  In general, this is consistent with previous research that 
probability estimates are closer to the statistically correct base-rate probability when more time is 
available to respond (Newman et al., 2017).   
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Figure 2.3. Mean probability estimates for Experiment 1 as a function of Time x Extremity. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
The Congruency x Extremity interaction was significant, F(4,476)=5.3, p<.001, ηp2=0.04.  
The means for this interaction are found in Table 2.1.  The extremity effect was present within 
each congruency condition (ts(119)>2.88, ps<.015).  The difference between extreme and 
moderate estimates was larger in the neutral condition (+13.26; t(119)=8.52, p<.001) than the 
incongruent condition (+6.8; t(119)=3.64, p<.001) and the congruent condition (+7.29; 
t(119)=4.79, p<.001).  Thus, the effect of the extremity manipulation was largest in the neutral 
congruency condition where the personality descriptions are uninformative.  This result is 
generally consistent with the prediction that the extremity effect would be found in the congruent 
and neutral conditions but only for extreme problems in the incongruent condition (Newman et 
al., 2017).  Instead, probability estimates differed across all congruency and extremity 
conditions.  Lastly, the Time x Congruency x Extremity interaction was not significant, 
F(4,476)=1.72, p=.143, ηp2=0.01.   
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Figure 2.4. Mean probability estimates for Experiment 1 as a function of Congruency x 
Extremity. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Table 2.1. Mean probability estimates by congruency and extremity. 
Congruency  Extremity  Mean  SD  N  
Incongruent   Extreme   43.61   21.73   120   
    Moderate   36.81   16.75   120   
    Balanced   32.61   13.38   120   
Congruent   Extreme   80.67   15.73   120   
    Moderate   73.38   11.71   120   
    Balanced   67.53   14.38   120   
Neutral   Extreme   70.67   17.97   120   
    Moderate   57.41   10.62   120   
    Balanced   50.92   11.33   120   
 
2.6.3. Behavioural index sensitivity. 
2.6.3.1. Confidence. 
 The confidence rating data are plotted in Figure 2.5.  Based on considerable research on 
conflict effects in reasoning (De Neys, 2014), confidence for incongruent problems was expected 
to be lower than for congruent problems.  This is one of the hallmark indicators of conflict 
detection.  As predicted, a congruency effect was observed on confidence, F(2,238)=81.22, 
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p<.001, ηp2=0.41.  Incongruent trial confidence (M=6.66, SD=1.1) was lower than congruent trial 
confidence (M=7.0, SD=1.02; t(119)=6.5, p<.001), replicating the typical effect of conflict on 
confidence.   
Confidence for neutral problems was a critical test of the indices of conflict detection.  
Lower confidence for incongruent problems (where there is conflict) than the neutral problems is 
consistent with the conflict-detection interpretation.  Conversely, lower confidence for neutral 
problems than incongruent problems is consistent with the position that there are other cognitive 
processes during reasoning besides conflict that reduce confidence.   
Consistent with past research (Thompson et al., 2011), confidence for neutral trials 
(M=6.2, SD=1.07) was lower than both incongruent and congruent trials (ts(119)>6.5, ps<.001).  
This result is inconsistent with the conflict-detection interpretation and suggests that lower 
confidence for incongruent problems (relative to congruent problems) may not index conflict 
detection per se, because reduced confidence is also associated with neutral problems.  
Potentially, for neutral problems, lack of coherence or relative uncertainty may also function to 
reduce confidence.  If this is the case, one cannot be sure that lower confidence for incongruent 
problems relative to congruent problems is not also explained (to some degree) by these other 
cognitive phenomena. 
 The extremity effect was expected to interact with congruency; varying the base-rate ratio 
extremity varies the degree of conflict in the problems.  Under the conflict detection 
interpretation, the effect of extremity on confidence should be observable for incongruent 
problems (i.e., the conflict problems), strongest when the base-rate ratio is extreme, and not 
present in the congruent and neutral conditions.  Alternatively, if confidence is also an index of 
coherence or uncertainty, extremity would also influence confidence on congruent problems.  
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The coherence of the base-rate ratio and personality descriptions would serve to increase 
confidence. 
The Congruency x Extremity interaction was significant, F(4,476)=5.89, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.05.  Means for the interaction are presented in Table 2.2.  Crucially, contrary to the 
conflict-detection interpretation, confidence did not differ between extremity conditions for 
incongruent problems, F(2,238)=1.19, p=.306, ηp2=0.01.  As a measure of conflict detection, 
confidence was not sensitive to the degree of conflict between base-rate ratio and personality 
description for incongruent problems.  In the neutral condition, confidence did not differ between 
extremity conditions either, F(2,238)=2.8, p=.063, ηp2=0.02.   
 
 
Figure 2.5. Mean confidence ratings for Experiment 1 as a function of Congruency x Extremity. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Table 2.2. Mean confidence ratings by congruency and extremity. 
Congruency  Extremity  Mean  SD  N  
Incongruent   Extreme   6.618   1.283   120   
    Moderate   6.621   1.226   120   
    Balanced   6.739   1.195   120   
Congruent   Extreme   7.275   1.069   120   
    Moderate   6.907   1.145   120   
    Balanced   6.819   1.215   120   
Neutral   Extreme   6.324   1.210   120   
    Moderate   6.104   1.272   120   
    Balanced   6.158   1.221   120   
 
The source of the interaction was an effect of extremity on confidence in the congruent 
condition, F(2,238)=17.71, p<.001, ηp2=0.13.  Extreme trials had higher confidence ratings than 
moderate trials (t(119)=4.37, p<.001) and balanced trials (t(119)=5.39, p<.001).  The moderate 
trials did not show greater confidence ratings than balanced trials (t(119)=1.17, p=.732).   
Post-hoc t-tests indicated that confidence was higher for congruent problems than 
incongruent problems when base-rate ratios were extreme (+0.66; t(119)=6.51, p<.001) and 
moderate (+0.29; t(119)=3.33, p=.001), but not balanced (+0.08; t(119)=0.95, p=.344).  The 
predominant conflict-detection interpretation (De Neys, 2014) of this pattern of confidence is 
that reasoners were sensitive to the degree of conflict in the problems: detecting the conflict 
reduced their confidence.  However, the Congruency x Extremity interaction indicates that the 
effect of extremity was not present for incongruent problems (nor neutral problems).  Instead, it 
was present for congruent, non-conflict problems.  The “conflict” effect was only present for the 
non-conflict congruent problems, strongly suggesting that the typical effect of conflict on 
confidence is a function of the coherence of information (Koriat, 2012).  The conflict-detection 
interpretation may have been a fundamental misattribution of the effect of conflict, where the 
assumption was that the effect negatively influenced confidence on conflict trials relative to non-
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conflict.  Instead, coherence may have a positive effect on non-conflict trials relative to conflict 
trials. 
Lastly, the time effect was also significant, F(1,119)=283.41, p<.001, ηp2=0.7, but did not 
interact with the other factors.  Overall, confidence at Time 2 (M=7.09, SD=0.95) was higher 
than confidence at Time 1 (M=6.15, SD=1.11).  An increase in confidence over time is consistent 
with previous evidence that confidence ratings in the two-response paradigm are generally higher 
at Time 2 (Thompson et al., 2011). 
2.6.3.2. Response Times. 
 Response time data (in seconds) are plotted in Figure 2.6.  Under the conflict-detection 
interpretation, response time and confidence both index the detection of conflict.  Thus, where 
confidence was expected to be lower (i.e., conflict problems), response times were expected to 
be longer.  Alternatively, the assumption that confidence and response time index the same 
underlying cognitive processes may not be warranted.  If the data pattern of response times is not 
analogous to the data pattern of confidence, it suggests that these measures index different 
cognitive factors.  As proposed above, lack of coherence reducing fluency or relative feelings of 
uncertainty may account for increased response times. 
The typical effect of conflict on response times was replicated with a congruency effect, 
F(2,238)=21.59, p<.001, ηp2=0.15, such that responses were faster in the congruent condition 
(M=12.11, SD=3.54) than the incongruent condition (M=12.86, SD=4.42; t(119)=3.71, p<.001).  
Thus, on average, responses were slower on conflict trials, one of the hallmark indicators of 
conflict detection.   
Critically, responses were slowest overall: slower in the neutral condition (M=13.54, 
SD=4.19) than the congruent condition (t(119)=7.43, p<.001) and incongruent condition 
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(t(119)=2.68, p=.025).  Therefore, the largest effect of “conflict” (i.e., increased response times) 
occurred in the non-conflict neutral condition, where response times were longest.  This result is 
also inconsistent with the conflict-detection interpretation that predicts the longest response 
times would be for incongruent problems.  De Neys and Glumicic (2008) found that response 
times were faster for congruent problems than neutral problems but that even longer response 
times were observed for incongruent problems.  Franssens and De Neys (2009) found no 
differences in response time between incongruent and neutral problems, both of which were 
longer than for congruent problems.  Our data contradicts these previous findings and suggests 
that response time is an impure index of conflict detection.   
The Congruency x Extremity interaction was not significant for response times, 
F(4,476)=1.76, p=.134, ηp2=0.02; the means for this interaction are in Table 2.3.  If response 
time and confidence indexed the same cognitive factors, this interaction would be expected to be 
analogous to the Congruency x Extremity interaction on confidence ratings reported above.  This 
study is the first investigation into the interaction of congruency and extremity on the hallmark 
indices of conflict detection.  The absence of a Congruency x Extremity interaction on response 
times indicates that confidence and response time may index different underlying cognitive 
factors.  To date, this discrepancy has not been observed in the conflict detection literature.  
There was power of 0.88 to find a relatively small effect size of ηp2=0.03 for the response time 
Congruency x Extremity interaction.  Thus, we had good power to detect this interaction but it 
was not observed. 
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Figure 2.6. Mean response times for Experiment 1 as a function of Congruency x Extremity. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Table 2.3. Mean response times by congruency and extremity. 
Congruency  Extremity  Mean (ms) SD  N  
Incongruent   Extreme   13213   5417   120   
    Moderate   12732   4998   120   
    Balanced   12632   4098   120   
Congruent   Extreme   11865   3683   120   
    Moderate   12131   4101   120   
    Balanced   12340   4157   120   
Neutral   Extreme   13513   4577   120   
    Moderate   13702   4939   120   
    Balanced   13389   4329   120   
 
The effect of time was significant, F(1,119)=6.46, p=.012, ηp2=0.05; response times were 
longer at Time 2 (+1.55; t(119)=6.55, p<.001).  This is unsurprising: participants were instructed 
to respond with the first thought that came to mind at Time 1 but think carefully at Time 2 and 
we applied time pressure to Time 1 responses.  The time effect also interacted with congruency, 
F(1.67,198.7)=4.63, p=.016, ηp2=0.04, but patterns were similar between Time 1 and Time 2.  At 
Time 1, incongruent responses (M=12.0, SD=2.63) were slower than congruent responses 
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(M=11.66, SD=2.77; t(119)=3.04, p=.009); also, neutral responses (M=12.52, SD=2.91) were 
slower than congruent and incongruent ones (ts(119)>4.03, ps<.001).  At Time 2, congruent 
responses (M=12.56, SD=5.97) were faster than incongruent responses (M=13.72, SD=7.96; 
t(119)=3.03, p=.009) and neutral responses (M=14.55, SD=7.26; t(119)=6.24, p<.001), but 
incongruent and neutral response times did not differ (t(119)=1.82, p=.215).  The extremity 
effect was not significant, F<1, nor was the Time x Extremity interaction, F(2,238)=1.16, 
p=.314, ηp2=0.01, or Time x Congruency x Extremity interaction, F(4,476)=1.99, p=.095, 
ηp2=0.02.   
2.6.3.3. Fixation Times. 
 The purpose of the eye-tracking measures was to measure visual attention.  Only the total 
fixation time (in seconds) in each area of interest per trial are reported2.  Areas of interest (AOI) 
were drawn around the base-rate ratio and personality descriptions.  The base-rate AOI occupied 
9% of the screen and the personality description AOI occupied 27% of the screen.   
The total fixation time per trial within each AOI was calculated for analyses.  A x 2 
(Time[Time 1, Time 2]) x 3 (Congruency[incongruent, congruent, neutral]) x 3 
(Extremity[extreme, moderate, balanced]) repeated-measures ANOVA was computed on fixation 
time for the personality description AOI and base-rate AOI separately.  Calibration failed for 
                                                             
2 Further analyses were conducted on total fixation frequency per AOI and the number of fixation swaps from one 
AOI to the other.  These measures were highly correlated with the fixation time measures (rs>.276; ps<.004) and are 
not reported here.  Analyses of AOI revisits were not significant.  Analysis of pupil diameter found a difference 
between AOIs, F(1,102)=31.84, p<.001, ηp2=0.24, with larger diameter for the personality sketch AOI.  Changes in 
pupil diameter are related to attention, emotions, arousal, decisions, cognitive load, and working-memory load (see 
Naber, Frässle, Rutishauser, & Einhäuser, 2013).  The multiple differences between our AOIs (size, amount of text 
and reading required, cognitive and working-memory load) prevent any interpretation of the main effect of AOI.  
For the base-rate AOI, an effect of time was recorded, F(1,79)=5.79, p=.018, ηp2=0.07, that interacted with 
congruency, F(2,158)=3.53, p=.032, ηp2=0.04, but the effect of congruency was not significant, F(2,158)=1.16, 
p=.316, ηp2=0.01.  Congruency was not significant at Time 1 (F<1) or Time 2, F(2,210)=1.12, p=.33, ηp2=0.01.  For 
the personality sketch AOI, all effects were non-significant (ps>.277).  The small effect of congruency on base-rate 
AOI pupil diameter suggests further investigation of pupil diameter changes during attention to probabilistic 
information or to explore relative weighting of information value (Ariel & Castel, 2014).  
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four participants; calibration succeeded but the eye-tracker failed to capture their eye-gaze data 
for three participants. 
 There is evidence that reasoners increase their attention on the conflicting information on 
conflict problems (Ball et al., 2006) and to the base-rate ratios in the base-rate task (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008).  Therefore, the conflict-detection interpretation predicts that fixation time 
would be higher for both the personality descriptions and base-rate ratios for incongruent 
problems than for neutral and congruent problems.  The coherence-resolution interpretation is 
that reasoners would increase their attention to neutral personality descriptions (perhaps as a 
function of uncertainty).  Fixation time that is higher for neutral personality descriptions than for 
incongruent descriptions provides a challenge to the conflict-detection interpretation. 
The personality sketch AOI fixation time data is presented in Figure 2.7.  The effect of 
congruency on fixation time was present on the personality sketch AOI, F(2,202)=13.24, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.12.  Inconsistent with the conflict-detection interpretation, fixation time for congruent 
(M=2.76, SD=1.49) and incongruent (M=2.79, SD=1.56) personality descriptions did not differ 
(t(111)=0.43, p>.999).  Fixation time was longer on neutral personality descriptions (M=3.09, 
SD=1.61) than fixation time on congruent descriptions (t(111)=4.12, p>.001) and incongruent 
descriptions (t(110)=3.76, p<.001).  Therefore, reasoners did not respond to the conflict by 
increasing their attention to the personality descriptions.  Instead, relative to congruent and 
incongruent problems, more attention was focused on the uninformative neutral personality 
descriptions.  Potentially, reasoners were searching for hidden information within the 
descriptions or attempting to decipher how the neutral descriptions would be relevant to the 
problems. 
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Figure 2.7. Mean fixation times on the personality sketch AOI for Experiment 1 as a function of 
Time x Congruency. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
The base-rate AOI fixation time data is presented in Figure 2.8.  The congruency effect 
on fixation time was also present for the base-rate AOI, F(2,202)=19.18, p<.001, ηp2=0.16, 
qualified by a Time x Congruency interaction, F(2,202)=7.64, p<.001, ηp2=0.07.  At Time 1, 
fixation time on the base-rate ratios for incongruent problems (M=1.92, SD=1.01) was not 
different from congruent problems (M=1.87, SD=1.08; t(108)=0.89, p>.999) or neutral problems 
(M=2.02, SD=1.06; t(108)=2.18, p=.095) but fixation time on the neutral problem base-rates was 
higher than for congruent problem base-rates (t(110)=3.24, p=.005).  Thus, inconsistent with the 
conflict-detection interpretation, the initial reaction to the conflict is not to review the base-rates 
more for the conflict (i.e., incongruent) problems compared to congruent problems, but rather, 
more time is spent attending to the neutral base-rates than the congruent base-rates.  At Time 2, 
fixation time on the base-rate ratios was lower for congruent problems (M=1.53, SD=1.24) than 
for incongruent problems (M=1.8, SD=1.52; t(110)=3.43, p=.003) and neutral problems 
(M=1.98, SD=1.54; t(110)=5.3, p<.001).  Fixation time on the base-rate ratios for incongruent 
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and neutral problems did not differ (t(110)=2.03, p=.135).  Thus, at Time 2, more fixation time is 
spent on the base-rates for incongruent and neutral problems but this result may be deceptive.  
Post-hoc t-tests revealed that fixation times on the base-rates were similar between Time 1 and 
Time 2 for incongruent problems (-0.07; t(108)=0.52, p=.605) and neutral problems (+0.004; 
t(110)=0.52, p=.974) but significantly lower at Time 2 for congruent problems (-0.3; 
t(110)=2.64, p=.01).  Therefore, the interaction occurred because reasoners spent less time 
focusing on the congruent base-rates at Time 2.  Contrary to the conflict-detection interpretation, 
longer fixation times on the incongruent base-rates (relative to congruent base-rates) did not 
appear to be re-evaluation of the conflicting statistical information in response to conflict but 
instead, a reduction of attention to congruent base-rates over time. 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Mean fixation times on the base-rate AOI for Experiment 1 as a function of Time x 
Congruency. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
2.6.4. Explicit Awareness: Self-Reports. 
2.6.4.1. Explicit Awareness Ratings. 
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 Participants responded to three questions intended to index their explicit awareness of 
conflict in the base-rate problems they had just completed.  In general, reasoners responded with 
relatively high awareness ratings to these questions: Q1 (M=3.61, SD=1.18), Q2 (M=4.45, 
SD=1.31), and Q3 (M=4.41, SD=1.28).  The measures correlated with one another; therefore, a 
composite score of explicit awareness was computed (M=4.14, SD=0.98) from Q1, Q2, and Q33. 
 Explicit awareness was predicted to correlate with the indices of conflict detection: 
confidence, response times, and fixation times (see Table 2.4).  No correlations were found 
between explicit awareness and any of the other measures4 (ρs<.13, ps>.181).  Response time 
and confidence did correlate (r=-.35, p<.001).  When this correlation is viewed in isolation, 
response time and confidence appear to index conflict detection in a manner consistent with the 
conflict-detection interpretation (De Neys, 2014), but this interpretation overlooks the above 
evidence that these measures are affected differently by manipulations of congruency and 
extremity.  Despite this, no evidence was found that explicit awareness was related to implicit 
detection of conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 Q1 correlated with Q2 (ρ=.39, p<.001) and Q3 (ρ=.28, p=.018), but Q2 and Q3 did not correlate significantly 
(ρ=.11, p=.37).  The subsequent analyses were run on each question separately, in addition to the composite score.  
These analyses did not differ from the composite score analyses and are not reported here. 
4 Correlations were also computed between the composite score and several of the confidence, response time, and 
fixation time conditions: Time 1, Time 2, averaged across Time, incongruent, congruent, neutral, a difference score 
of congruent minus incongruent, and averaged across all conditions.  None of these comparisons were significant.  
Only the variables average across all conditions are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 2.4. Spearman correlations between the implicit and explicit measures of conflict.  
      
Explicit 
Awareness  
Confidence  
Response 
Time  
Base Rate 
Fixation Time  
Description 
Fixation Time  
Explicit 
Awareness  
 Spearman's ρ   
 —   0.021   -0.015   0.084   0.126   
p-value   —   0.819   0.874   0.375   0.181   
Confidence   
Spearman's ρ      —   -0.330  ***  -0.079   0.013   
p-value       —   < .001   0.402   0.889   
Response 
Time  
 Spearman's ρ 
         —   0.255  **  0.243  **  
p-value           —   0.006   0.009   
Base Rate 
Fixation Time  
 Spearman's ρ 
             —   0.639  ***  
p-value               —   < .001   
Description 
Fixation Time  
 Spearman's ρ 
                 —   
p-value                   —   
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
2.6.4.2. Resolution Strategy. 
One novel feature of this study was to determine whether reasoners could explicitly 
report the general strategy they adopted to solve the base-rate problems.  At the end of the task, 
participants reported their strategy.  Participants that reported relying mostly on the ratios 
(numbers) or mostly on the descriptions (personality sketches) were placed into the Numbers and 
Sketches groups, respectively.  Those who reported taking a case-by-case approach were sorted 
into the Cases group.  Any participants who reported multiple strategies were placed in the Cases 
group; participants who reported choosing their answers randomly were excluded from the 
analyses.  Participants that chose to enter a description of their strategy were categorized 
accordingly.  For example, the following description was categorized as a Cases strategy: 
“My decision would vary depending on the [sic] personal sketches or numbers for each 
case.  I would rely [on] one more than the other.” 
In total, the reported strategies are as follows: Numbers strategy (N=26, 21.7%), Sketches 
strategy (N=53, 44.2%), Cases strategy (N=41, 34.2%).  The proportion of participants reporting 
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a Numbers strategy is consistent with the interpretation that cognitive “biases” observed at the 
aggregate level obscure a sizable minority of reasoners who prefer rule-based reasoning 
(Newman et al., 2017) or individual differences in conflict resolution between belief-based and 
rule-based information (Pennycook & Thompson, 2012).  To ascertain the ability of reasoners to 
(at least retrospectively) explicitly identify their overall approach to solving the reasoning 
problems, a 3 (Congruency[incongruent, congruent, neutral]) x 3 (Extremity[extreme, moderate, 
balanced]) x 2 (Time[Time 1, Time 2]) x 3 (Strategy[numbers, sketches, cases]) mixed-design 
ANOVA was computed for each of the five previous dependent measures (probability estimates, 
confidence, response times, and fixation times on the personality description and base-rate ratio 
separately). 
2.6.4.2.1. Probability estimates. 
 It was expected that those who relied primarily on the base-rate ratios would give 
probability estimates closer to the base-rate probability than those who relied on the personality 
descriptions.  Presumably, those who took a case-by-case approach would perform like an 
average of Numbers and Sketches strategies.  These data are plotted in Figure 2.9 and Figure 
2.10. 
An effect of strategy was found, F(2,117)=25.27, p<.001, ηp2=0.3.  As predicted, the 
Numbers group gave probability estimates closer to the base-rate probability (M=63.39, 
SD=5.47) than the Sketches group (M=53.83, SD=5.01; t(77)=7.1, p<.001) and Cases group 
(M=57.25, SD=6.42; t(65)=4.36, p<.001); Sketches group estimates were also further from the 
base-rate probability than Cases group estimates (t(92)=2.93, p=.012).  Thus, the reported 
conflict resolution strategies mapped sensibly onto the probability estimate data: those who 
reported relying on the ratios gave estimates closest to the base-rate probability, while those who 
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reported relying on the personality descriptions gave estimates furthest from the base-rate 
probability.  The case-by-case strategy gave estimates in between the other two strategies. 
 A Strategy x Congruency interaction was also found, F(4,234)=11.93, p<.001, ηp2=0.17.  
The coherence-resolution interpretation predicted that reasoners would be able to accurately 
report their strategy to resolve the conflict in the base-rate problems.  Crucially, in the 
incongruent condition, probability estimates between the strategy groups differed, 
F(2,117)=28.94, p<.001, ηp2=0.33.  For incongruent problems, the Numbers group gave 
probability estimates closer to the base-rate probability (M=50.01, SD=11.39) than Sketches 
(M=29.75, SD=11.18; t(77)=7.42, p<.001) and Cases groups (M=40.11, SD=11.7; t(65)=3.46, 
p=.002).  The Cases group also gave probability estimates closer to the base-rate probability than 
the Sketches group (t(92)=4.37, p<.001).  Thus, the effect of strategy was present for incongruent 
(i.e., conflict) problems. 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Mean probability estimates for Experiment 1 as a function of Strategy x Congruency. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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For neutral problems, the effect of strategy was also significant, F(2,117)=12.54, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.18: the Numbers group gave probability estimates closer to the base-rate probability 
(M=66.25, SD=6.24) than the Sketches (M=56.18, SD=8.19; t(77)=5.0, p<.001) and Cases 
groups (M=60.0, SD=9.79; t(65)=2.96, p=.011), but the Sketches and Cases groups did not differ 
on their probability estimates (t(92)=2.18, p=.093).  The Numbers group (M=73.91, SD=8.02), 
Sketches group (M=75.55, SD=11.09), and Cases group (M=71.64, SD=9.29) did not differ on 
probability estimates for congruent problems, F(2,117)=1.81, p=.169, ηp2=0.03. 
In sum, the pattern of probability estimates sensibly mapped on to the self-reported 
strategies.  Probability estimates for congruent and incongruent problems differed the least in the 
Numbers group (+23.9; t(25)=7.9, p<.001) and the most in the Sketches group (+45.8; 
t(52)=16.76, p<.001).  The difference in the Cases group was greater than the Numbers group but 
less than the Sketches group (+31.53; t(40)=11.58, p<.001).  Therefore, the self-reported strategy 
groups differed for their probability estimates on conflict (i.e., incongruent) problems relative to 
non-conflict (i.e., congruent) problems.  In other words, these groups differed on their strategy to 
resolve the conflict and could accurately report on the general strategy they adopted to solve the 
problems. 
Strategy also interacted with extremity, F(4,234)=13.85, p<.001, ηp2=0.195.  In the 
extreme base-rate condition, probability estimates differed between all the groups, 
F(2,117)=25.75, p<.001, ηp2=0.31.  The Numbers group gave probability estimates closer to the 
base-rate probability (M=77.22, SD=12.08) than the Sketches (M=58.32, SD=9.4; t(77)=7.15, 
p<.001) and Cases groups (M=65.83, SD=12.27; t(65)=4.12, p<.001); the Cases group also gave 
                                                             
5 Qualified by a Time x Extremity x Strategy interaction, F(3.58,209.66)=4.28, p=.003, ηp2=0.07.  The interaction 
with time occurred because the Numbers group gave probability estimates closer to the base-rate probability than the 
Sketches and Cases groups for only extreme base-rates at Time 1 (ts>4.28, ps<.001); the reported Extremity x 
Strategy interaction pattern emerged at Time 2. 
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probability estimates closer to the base-rate probability than the Sketches group (t(92)=3.27, 
p=.004).  For moderate base-rates, the effect of Strategy was also significant, F(2,117)=15.14, 
p<.001, ηp2=0.21.  The Sketches group (M=52.09, SD=7.28) gave probability estimates further 
from the base-rate probability than the Numbers; (M=60.98, SD=6.35; t(77)=5.2, p<.001) and 
Cases groups (M=57.5, SD=7.43; t(92)=3.64, p=.001).  The probability estimates of the Numbers 
and Cases groups did not differ on moderate problems (t(65)=1.94, p=.164).  For balanced base-
rates, the effect of strategy was marginally significant, F(2,117)=3.09, p=.049, ηp2=0.05.  The 
Numbers group (M=51.97, SD=3.727) gave probability estimates that did not differ from the 
probability estimates given by the Sketches group (M=51.06, SD=6.93; t(77)=0.6, p>.999) or 
Cases group (M=48.41, SD=6.83; t(65)=2.24, p=.082).  Probability estimates for the Sketches 
and Cases group also did not differ (M=75.55, SD=11.09; t(92)=2.01, p=.141).  The group most 
sensitive to the extremity manipulation is the group that reported a strategy of reliance upon the 
ratios, and the group least sensitive is the group that reported primarily relying on the personality 
sketches.  In sum, the probability estimates match closely the strategy reports given by 
participants, suggesting that reasoners can give accurate retrospective assessments of their 
conflict resolution strategy. 
 
46 
 
Figure 2.10. Mean probability estimates for Experiment 1 as a function of Strategy x Extremity. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
2.6.4.2.2. Confidence. 
There was no effect of self-reported strategy on confidence (F<1), but there was a 
Congruency x Strategy interaction, F(4,234)=5.76, p<.001, ηp2=0.09.  The data are presented in 
Figure 2.11.  The test of the strategy effect on incongruent problems was significant, 
F(2,117)=3.07, p=.05, ηp2=0.05, but pairwise tests found no differences between each group for 
confidence.  For incongruent problems, the Numbers group reported confidence (M=6.44, 
SD=1.08) that did not differ from the reported confidence in the Sketches group (M=6.93, 
SD=1.08; t(77)=1.92, p=.172) or the Cases group (M=6.44, SD=1.08; t(65)=0.08, p>.999).  The 
Sketches and Cases groups also reported confidence that did not statistically differ (t(92)=2.18, 
p=.094).  Post-hoc t-tests found that the Sketches group did show higher confidence on 
incongruent problems than the Cases group (t(92)=2.18, p=.032) and marginally higher than the 
Numbers group (t(77)=1.92, p=.058).  These data suggest there is some difference in sensitivity 
to conflict (as indexed by confidence) between strategies, where those who report relying on a 
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Sketches strategy are less sensitive to conflict.  The Numbers group (M=6.83, SD=1.14), 
Sketches group (M=7.17, SD=1.09) and Cases group (M=6.89, SD=0.84) did not differ on their 
confidence for congruent problems, F(2,117)=1.39, p=.253, ηp2=0.02.  For neutral problems, it 
was predicted that the Sketches group would display the lowest confidence, but reported 
confidence from the Numbers group (M=6.25, SD=1.25), Sketches group (M=6.15, SD=1.05), 
and Cases group (M=6.22, SD=1.01) did not differ (F<1).   
 
 
Figure 2.11. Mean confidence ratings for Experiment 1 as a function of Strategy x Congruency. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
There was a Time x Strategy interaction, F(2,117)=4.37, p=.015, ηp2=0.07.  However, 
confidence did not differ between groups at Time 1, F(2,117)=1.94, p=.149, ηp2=0.03, or at Time 
2, (F<1).  Time 1 confidence in the Numbers (M=5.93, SD=1.28), Sketches (M=6.37, SD=1.1), 
and Cases (M=6.01, SD=0.97) groups was lower than at Time 2 for each group: Numbers 
(M=7.08, SD=1.04; t(25)=7.47, p<.001), Sketches (M=7.14, SD=1.0; t(52)=10.43, p<.001), and 
Cases (M=7.03, SD=0.84; t(25)=12.55, p<.001).  The interaction occurred because the difference 
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was similar in the Numbers (+1.15) and Cases (+1.02) groups, but smaller in the Sketches group 
(+0.77) relative to the other groups. 
2.6.4.2.3. Response time. 
 For response times, the prediction was that the Cases group would take the longest to 
respond.  Instead, the self-reported strategy groups did not differ, F(2,117)=2.38, p=.097, 
ηp2=0.04, but strategy did interact with time, F(2,117)=4.35, p=.015, ηp2=0.07.  At Time 1, 
response times for the Numbers group (M=11.79, SD=3.14), Sketches group (M=12.25, 
SD=2.69), and Cases group (M=11.99, SD=2.33) did not differ (F<1), presumably because of the 
time pressure applied to Time 1 responses.   
At Time 2, response times differed as a function of strategy, F(2,117)=3.71, p=.027, 
ηp2=0.06.  Overall, the Cases strategy had the longest response times (M=15.62, SD=7.58), which 
were longer than the Sketches strategy (M=11.94, SD=4.47; t(92)=2.72, p=.023).  The Numbers 
group response times (M=13.85, SD=6.72) were not different from the Sketches (t(77)=1.23, 
p=.665) or Cases strategy response times (t(65)=1.08, p=.848).  The effect of strategy on 
response times was found in the predicted pattern: taking a case-by-case approach to conflict 
resolution was more time consuming than relying primarily on one source of information (i.e., 
numbers or sketches strategies). 
There was also a Strategy x Extremity interaction, F(4,234)=2.82, p=.026, ηp2=0.05; 
these data are presented in Figure 2.12.  Response times for the Numbers group (M=12.53, 
SD=4.28), Sketches group (M=12.22, SD=3.58), and Cases group (M=13.91, SD=4.4) did not 
differ for the extreme base-rates, F(2,117)=2.17, p=.119, ηp2=0.04.  For the balanced base-rates, 
the Numbers group (M=12.61, SD=3.93), Sketches group (M=12.26, SD=3.42), and Cases group 
(M=13.59, SD=3.94) also did not differ on response times, F(2,117)=1.52, p=.223, ηp2=0.03.  For 
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moderate base-rates, the strategy effect was significant, F(2,117)=3.4, p=.037, ηp2=0.06.  
Response times for the Numbers group (M=13.33, SD=4.23) were not different from Sketches 
group (M=11.8, SD=3.31; t(77)=1.58, p=.351) or Cases group response times (M=13.92, 
SD=4.74; t(65)=0.58, p>.999), but the Sketches group did have shorter response times than the 
Cases group (t(92)=2.52, p=.039).   
 
 
Figure 2.12. Mean response times for Experiment 1 as a function of Strategy x Extremity. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
 
2.6.4.2.4. Eye-tracking. 
 A 2 (AOI[base-rate, personality description]) x 3 (Congruency[incongruent, congruent, 
neutral]) x 3 (Extremity[extreme, moderate, balanced]) x 2 (Time[Time 1, Time 2]) x 3 
(Strategy[numbers, sketches, cases]) mixed-design ANOVA was computed to determine relative 
differences in fixation time between strategy groups.  A main effect of AOI, F(1,99)=71.73, 
p<.001, ηp2=0.42, was qualified by an AOI x Strategy interaction, F(2,99)=3.77, p=.026, 
ηp2=0.07.  The data are presented in Figure 2.13.  For the personality description AOI, the 
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Numbers group (M=2.61, SD=1.68), Sketches group (M=2.95, SD=1.39), and Cases group 
(M=2.77, SD=1.58) did not differ on fixation times, F<1.  Also, fixation time on the base-rate 
AOI for the Numbers group (M=2.05, SD=1.07), Sketches group (M=1.64, SD=0.97), and Cases 
group (M=1.87, SD=1.11) did not differ, F(2,111)=1.4, p=.25, ηp2=0.03.  Each group fixated less 
on the base-rate ratios than the personality descriptions: Numbers group (t(24)=2.33, p=.026), 
Sketches group (t(49)=8.36, p<.001), and Cases group (t(38)=5.18, p<.001).  The difference in 
fixation time between the personality description and base-rate was larger for the Sketches group 
(+1.31) than the Cases group (+0.9) and Numbers group (+0.56).  In other words, this interaction 
occurred because the ratio of fixation time of personality description to base-rate ratio is smallest 
in the Numbers group and largest in the Sketches group.  This pattern reflects what would be 
expected of these conflict resolution strategies. 
 
 
Figure 2.13. Mean fixation times for Experiment 1 as a function of Strategy x AOI. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
2.6.4.2.5. Explicit awareness. 
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 The Cases group was predicted to report the highest explicit awareness of conflict.  A 
one-way ANOVA was calculated; the effect of strategy was significant, F(2,117)=3.63, p=.029, 
ηp2=0.06.  The Cases group reported explicit awareness (M=4.46, SD=0.9) that was marginally 
higher than explicit awareness reports from the Numbers (M=3.89 SD=1.27; t(65)=2.38, p=.057) 
and Sketches groups (M=4.02, SD=0.82; t(92)=2.23, p=.083).  The Numbers and Sketches 
groups did not differ on their explicit awareness reports (t(77)=0.56, p>.999).  This result 
suggests that explicit awareness of conflict may be a function of resolution strategy; the strategy 
that would weigh the conflicting evidence most equally reported the highest explicit awareness 
of conflict. 
2.7. Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 1 do not align with the predictions of the conflict-detection 
interpretation (De Neys, 2012; 2014).  Instead, the conflict phenomena are more consistent with 
a coherence-resolution interpretation.  The presumed indices of conflict detection appeared to be 
sensitive to other cognitive factors than conflict and did not appear to measure the same 
underlying cognitive processes.  Reasoners also reported an explicit awareness of the conflict, 
which is inconsistent with the conflict-detection interpretation. 
The hallmark indicators of conflict detection may have been misinterpreted in the conflict 
detection literature.  For congruent problems relative to incongruent problems, the typical 
conflict effects of lower confidence, longer response times, and longer fixation times on the 
conflicting base-rate ratios and personality descriptions replicated the patterns reported in the 
conflict detection literature (De Neys, 2014).  Critically, each of these “conflict” effects (lower 
confidence, longer response times, longer fixation times) were found to be more pronounced for 
neutral (i.e., non-conflict) problems, suggesting that these measures are indexing other cognitive 
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factors than purely conflict detection, such as coherence monitoring and conflict resolution.  
Furthermore, confidence varied as a function of the base-rate ratio extremity for non-conflict 
(i.e., congruent) problems, not conflict (i.e., incongruent) problems, suggesting that the 
traditional effect of conflict on confidence is not a relative decrease in the presence of conflict, 
but rather, a relative increase in the presence of coherent information.   
It has been assumed that behavioural measures, such as confidence, response times, and 
eye-gaze fixation, all index the same underlying cognitive process of conflict detection (De 
Neys, 2014).  Contrary to this interpretation, the interaction of congruency and extremity on 
confidence ratings was not consistent with the response time and fixation time data.  In other 
words, the presumed conflict detection effects were not consistent across the typical conflict 
detection indices, suggesting that these measures are indexing different underlying cognitive 
factors.  Potentially, response times and fixation times may index conflict resolution, while 
confidence indexes detection of the coherence of information.  In sum, consistent with 
Hypothesis A, the measures of confidence, response times, and fixation times appeared to be 
sensitive to (a) multiple cognitive factors and (b) not necessarily the same cognitive factors as 
each other. 
The base-rate neglect phenomenon was replicated, as was pattern of probability estimates 
when neutral problems are included in the task (Newman et al., 2017): probability estimates were 
closest to the base-rate probability for congruent problems and furthest from the base-rate 
probability for incongruent problems.  Estimates for neutral problems were closer to and further 
from the base-rate probability than incongruent and congruent estimates, respectively.  
Additionally, the Numbers group provided probability estimates closest to the base-rate 
probability, while the Sketches group gave estimates furthest from the base-rate probability.  
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This result is consistent with the interpretation that base-rate neglect is a function of strategy 
(Pennycook & Thompson, 2012), where the strategy that would lead to the statistically correct 
response was applied by only a minority of reasoners (in this sample, approximately 20% of 
participants).  In sum, the pattern of probability estimates is consistent with past research and 
Hypothesis C: the base-rate neglect phenomenon is a function of the resolution strategy adopted 
by the reasoner. 
The retrospective strategy self-reports provided by reasoners were accurate regarding 
their conflict resolution strategy, mapping sensibly on to all the behavioural measures.  As 
indexed by confidence, the Sketches group appeared least sensitive to conflict, which would be 
expected given that they value the base-rate ratios the least; the manipulation of conflict is 
achieved through changing the base-rate ratios.  The Cases group took the longest to respond, as 
they were the group that would have needed the most time to evaluate the evidence and resolve 
the conflict.  The group most explicitly aware of the conflict was the Cases group.  The pattern of 
visual attention also trended towards the expected pattern: less fixation time on base-rate ratios 
for the Sketches group.  Taken together, these data suggest that reasoners are capable of 
insightful, accurate self-reports regarding their performance and strategy chosen on this 
reasoning task.  
Finally, consistent with Hypothesis B, reasoners reported relatively high explicit 
awareness of conflict.  Surprisingly, this measure did not correlate with any of the typical 
implicit indices of conflict detection.  Two interpretations of these data are available.  The first is 
that the implicit and explicit measures are indexing different cognitive factors (e.g., detection and 
resolution, respectively).  The second is that these measures were not valid assessments of 
explicit awareness of conflict, despite the apparent success of the strategy self-reports.  The goal 
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of Experiment 2 was to address this concern by manipulating explicit awareness, rather than 
measuring it. 
Chapter 3. Experiment 2 
 The goals of Experiment 2 were twofold.  First, the predicted relationship between 
implicit measures of conflict detection and explicit measures of conflict awareness was not found 
in Experiment 1.  One possibility is that the novel measures of explicit awareness were not 
sufficiently sensitive to index explicit awareness.  Experiment 2 is an attempt to experimentally 
manipulate the explicit awareness of conflict.  Second, the novel measure of conflict resolution 
strategy from Experiment 1 was found to predict behavioural measures in the predicted manner.  
Thus, this experiment is also a replication of the strategy effects found on probability estimates, 
confidence, and response times in Experiment 1. 
 This study attempted to experimentally increase and decrease explicit awareness with a 
between-participants manipulation using three groups: an intervention group, a dual-task group, 
and a control group.  A base-rate task was used and problems were presented in two equal blocks 
of trials.  To increase explicit awareness, a retrospective questionnaire (the same set of questions 
regarding explicit awareness from Experiment 1) was given to the intervention group after they 
had completed the first block of problems.  All three groups completed the same retrospective 
questionnaire at the end of the task, as well (the intervention group responded to this set of 
questions twice, in total).  In Experiment 1, these questions were given at the end of the task to 
avoid alerting reasoners to the conflict in the questions.  In this case, the intention is to actively 
notify participants in the intervention group that the problems they are solving contain some 
degree of conflicting information or competing responses.  It was expected that these 
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straightforward queries would alert reasoners to conflict and increase their explicit awareness of 
conflict in the second half of the task (i.e., Block 2). 
 To decrease explicit awareness, a dual-task paradigm was used.  Concurrent secondary 
tasks are applied to occupy working-memory resources (Bethell-Fox & Shepard, 1988).  This 
paradigm has been previously applied in the reasoning literature.  De Neys (2006) used a dual-
task paradigm for conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and Wason selection 
(Wason, 1966) reasoning tasks.  He found that fewer normatively correct responses were given 
under working-memory load; incorrect responses also took less time than correct ones.  It was 
concluded that the concurrent task occupied working-memory resources and reduced relative 
reasoning ability of the participants.   
In this study, the goal was to use a secondary task to interfere with the ability to 
recognize conflict in the problems for the dual-task group.  It has been argued that successful 
conflict detection is a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for correct responding on 
conflict reasoning tasks (De Neys, 2012; 2014).  Therefore, the secondary task may serve to 
interfere with explicit awareness of conflict, but not necessarily prevent implicit detection of the 
conflict.  A control group was also included as a baseline. 
Alongside the block and between-participants manipulations, congruency was also 
manipulated using congruent, incongruent, and balanced problems.  All personality descriptions 
were informative; no neutral descriptions were used in Experiment 2.  Congruent and 
incongruent problems contained extreme base-rates while balanced problems contained balanced 
base-rates.  Balanced problems were included as a control condition that was expected to be 
analogous to neutral problems.  In neutral problems, the personality description is uninformative; 
in balanced problems, the base-rate ratio is uninformative. 
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3.1. Hypotheses 
3.1.1. Probability estimates, confidence ratings, and response times.  
Probability estimates were expected to be closer to the base-rate probability for congruent 
problems than incongruent problems; probability estimates for balanced problems were predicted 
to be higher than incongruent problems but lower than congruent problems (because the base-
rate probability is approximately 0.5 in balanced problems, probability estimates are not 
compared on their proximity to the base-rate probability but instead, their overall magnitude).  
Similarly, the conflict effects found in Experiment 1 were predicted to be found in Experiment 2.  
Confidence was expected to be higher for congruent problems than incongruent problems.  Also, 
response times were expected to be longer for incongruent problems than congruent problems.  
Based on Experiment 1 data for balanced base-rates, balanced problem confidence and response 
times were expected to be comparable to incongruent problem confidence and response times.   
3.1.2. Hypothesis 2A: Explicit awareness of conflict can be increased and decreased. 
The between-participants manipulation was expected to influence explicit awareness 
reports: the intervention group would report higher explicit awareness than the control group.  
The dual-task group was expected to report lower explicit awareness than the control and 
intervention groups in both blocks.  Also, the intervention group would report higher explicit 
awareness in the questionnaire at the end of the task after Block 2 than they reported in the 
questionnaire at the mid-point of the task after Block 1. 
3.1.3. Hypothesis 2B: The relationship between base-rate neglect and conflict 
resolution strategy is robust. 
The robust relationship between conflict resolution strategy and probability estimates was 
also expected to be replicated: for the critical incongruent problems, the Numbers group would 
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give responses closer to the base-rate probability than the Cases group, who in turn would give 
responses closer to the base-rate probability than the Sketches group.  Furthermore, for 
incongruent problems, the Cases group would have the longest response times and the Sketches 
group would report the highest confidence.  Finally, the Cases group would report the highest 
explicit awareness of conflict. 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants. 
 One hundred sixty-five participants (104 female, 61 male, Mage=22.1 years) from the 
University of Saskatchewan took part in the study either for partial course credit or from 
advertisements posted on the campus website (who were compensated CAN $7.50). 
3.2.2. Apparatus and Stimuli. 
 The task was performed on a Microsoft Windows desktop computer using the E-Prime 
Psychology Software Tools program (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).  Twenty-four 
base-rate problems were used.  Incongruent and congruent trials were consistent with 
Experiment 1.  Instead of neutral problems with uninformative descriptions, balanced base-rates 
with informative personality descriptions (the same as incongruent and congruent) were used as 
a control condition.  Eight problems from each congruency condition were solved (four in each 
block).  All base-rates in the congruent and incongruent problems were extreme (e.g., 995:5) 
with four variations (e.g., 996:4, 995:5, 996:4, 997:3).  Base-rates in the balanced problems were 
all approximately 50:50 (e.g., 510:490) with four variations.  Problems were presented in two 
blocks.  Each block contained a list of twelve problems; the order of the lists was 
counterbalanced across participants.  Congruency was also counterbalanced across participants.  
The 24 base-rate problems were tested equally often in each congruency condition: congruent, 
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incongruent, and balanced.  Problem content was not repeated throughout the task for any 
participant.  For a full list of base-rate problems, refer to Appendix D. 
 The same self-report question of conflict resolution strategy from Experiment 1 was 
given in Experiment 2; this question was presented to all participants at the end of the base-rate 
task and was not included in the mid-task questionnaire in the intervention group.  The same 
explicit awareness questions from Experiment 1 were also given at the end of the task to all the 
groups (and also to the intervention group after Block 1).  As a further attempt to discriminate 
those who display low and high explicit awareness of conflict, one of the questions was changed 
from a 7-point Likert scale rating to a yes-no response option: “Did you notice that sometimes 
the personality sketch and the numbers suggested different responses?”  Participants who 
responded “no” to this question did not answer the other two explicit awareness questions.   
 The spatial memory task was a same-different task using a 5x5 grid of squares (adapted 
from Trbovich & LeFevre, 2003); each trial type was equally likely.  In the pre-trial grids, eight 
of the 25 squares on the grid contained an asterisk and each asterisk could not be adjacent to 
more than one other asterisk on the grid.  This was to avoid the patterns resembling recognizable 
shapes, such as letters (Trbovich & LeFevre, 2003).  The post-trial grids contained yes-no 
response options below the grid.  In same-type trials, post-trial grids were identical to the pre-
trial grids.  In different-type trials, post-trial grids contained one difference from the 
corresponding pre-trial grid: one asterisk was moved to one adjacent position on the grid from its 
initial position (above, below, left, or right).  The grid position of each asterisk was randomly 
generated, as were the asterisk and direction of movement in the post-trial grids.  The post-trial 
asterisk movement randomization was subject to the above rule regarding asterisk proximity.   
3.2.3. Procedure. 
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Base-rate problems were presented in two blocks (ordered randomly within block) in a 
single-response paradigm.  A fixation cross preceded each base-rate problem for two seconds.  
Participants provided probability estimates (on a scale from 0 to 100) subject to the same time-
pressure used in Experiment 1 (white text shifted to red text after 11 seconds elapsed).  For each 
probability estimate, participants entered a rating of their confidence in their response on a nine-
point Likert scale (1 – Guessing, 9 – Certain I'm Right).  Response times were also recorded for 
each probability estimate once the Enter key was pressed on the keyboard.  Upon completion of 
all 24 base-rate problems, self-reports were taken from each participant, but none of the filler 
questions from Experiment 1 were used.  The same instructions from Experiment 1 were used 
but omitted information regarding the two-response paradigm used in Experiment 1.  Additional 
instructions were included for participants in the dual-task group (see below), stressing the 
importance of the visual memory task. 
The trial progression for Experiment 2 is displayed in Figure 3.1.  A central fixation cross 
was presented for two seconds, followed by the base-rate problem for the Time 1 probability 
estimate.  After 11 seconds had elapsed and a response had not been entered, the text colour 
shifted from white to red.  The problem in red text remained on screen until a response was 
provided.   
 The dual-task group saw a pre-trial grid (displayed for 1.5 seconds) before each base-rate 
problem, preceded by a notification to “please remember the following grid.”  After responding 
and rating their confidence, participants were presented with a post-trial grid and indicated 
whether the grids were the same or different as the pre-trial grid with a key press (in free time).  
The grid presented with each base-rate problem was randomly determined for each participant to 
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prevent pairing of particular grids with particular base-rate problems.  The secondary-task 
instructions are as follows: 
Prior to each problem, an image of a 5x5 grid will be displayed.  Some of the cells will 
contain an asterisk (*), and some will be empty.  You are to remember which cells have 
asterisks in them, as another 5x5 grid will be displayed after you respond to the problem.  
You will be asked to determine if it is the same grid as the initial grid.   
It is VERY IMPORTANT that you be as accurate as possible when judging whether the 
second grid is the same as the first or not.  Do your best to remember the grid. You will 
respond with the arrow keys on the keyboard. 
 
Figure 3.1. Event sequence for Experiment 2 trials (with simplified text for legibility; see 
Appendix D for problem text).  The pre- and post-trial grids were only displayed in the dual-task 
group. 
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 After completion of the base-rate task, the explicit awareness questions and strategy 
assessment were taken.  The strategy assessment was presented first.  The yes-no awareness 
question was asked next; those who responded “yes” subsequently answered the other two 
awareness questions.  These questions were presented sequentially for all participants.  The 
intervention group had the same set of three explicit awareness questions posed at the midpoint 
of the task, between Block 1 and Block 2.  Completion of the self-report questions concluded the 
task. 
3.3. Results 
 Mean response time was 12.59 seconds.  A mean response time was calculated for each 
participant; any trial with a response time greater than 2.5SD above their individual mean 
response time was excluded from the analyses.  A total of 2.1% of responses were removed as 
outliers.  The three participants that reported responding randomly and the seven participants 
who did not provide strategy reports were excluded from analyses, which left a total of 165 
participants included in the analyses, divided into three explicit-awareness groups: control 
(N=52), intervention (N=56), and dual-task (N=57)6.  Results significant at α = .05 are reported 
here.  Interactions are decomposed with pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni correction.  
Violations of the assumption of sphericity were calculated with Mauchly’s test of sphericity and 
corrected with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction; the correction was only reported when the 
uncorrected and Greenhouse-Geisser p-values differed from each other. 
                                                             
6 Overall, percentage correct on the spatial working-memory task was 72.8.  Also, the strategy groups did not differ 
on accuracy (F<1): Numbers group (M=72.9, SD=0.09), Sketches group (M=72.2, SD=0.12), and Cases group 
(M=73.7, SD=0.11). 
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Two errors were discovered in the computer program for this task.  First, a sample of 
participants (N=81) were collected for Experiment 2 but trials were sequentially presented, not 
randomized.  To remedy this, a second sample with proper randomization was collected (N=84) 
to replace the original sample.  The two samples of participants were compared as a between-
participants factor on all dependent measures.  No differences were observed for explicit 
awareness ratings (F<1), confidence (Fs<1.64, ps>.198), and response times (Fs<2.72, ps>.68).  
An interaction with congruency was found for probability estimates, F(1.7,268.54)=3.75, 
p=.031, ηp2=0.03.  The means are presented in Table 3.1.  Probability estimates did not differ for 
incongruent problems between the first sample and second sample (t(163)=0.59, p=.555).  
Similarly, for balanced problems, probability estimates from the first sample did not differ from 
the second sample (t(162)=0.12, p=.905).  The only difference was found for congruent 
problems, where probability estimates were higher in the first sample than the second sample 
(t(163)=2.4, p=.017).  It was reasonable to conclude that this difference was not problematic for 
the analyses of interest in Experiment 2.  Therefore, the samples were combined for the current 
analyses to increase statistical power.  Notably, the same pattern of results reported below is 
found in analyses using only the second, corrected sample. 
 
Table 3.1. Mean probability estimates by congruency and sample. 
   Sample  N  Mean  SD  SE  
Incongruent  1   81   41.32   23.761   2.640   
    2   84   43.42   21.815   2.380   
Congruent  1   81   78.92   13.634   1.515   
    2   84   73.81   13.680   1.493   
Balanced   1   80   50.80   8.398   0.939   
    2   84   50.65   7.550   0.824   
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The second error was that three of the 24 items used in Experiment 2 contained neutral 
descriptions instead of the intended informative descriptions.  These items were presented 
equally often in each congruency condition and each block and were removed from the reported 
analyses.  Previously performed analyses that included these items primarily did not differ from 
the reported analyses below. 
3.3.1. Analysis Strategy. 
A 3 (Congruency[incongruent, congruent, neutral]) x 2 (Block[Block 1, Block 2]) x 3 
(Explicit-Awareness[control, intervention, dual-task]) mixed-design ANOVA was computed for 
probability estimates, confidence, and response times.  The first section is a set of analyses to test 
for replications of the base-rate neglect phenomenon and the typical effects of conflict: lower 
confidence and longer response times for incongruent problems relative to congruent problems.  
The balanced problems served as a control condition; based upon the results of Experiment 1, 
performance for balanced problems was predicted to be comparable to incongruent problem 
performance.  The second section is a test of Hypothesis 2A: the explicit awareness of conflict 
would be increased by expressly questioning reasoners about the presence of conflict (i.e., the 
intervention group) and decreased by occupying working-memory resources with a concurrent 
task (i.e., the dual-task group).  The third and final section is a test for replication of the 
relationship between self-reported conflict resolution strategy and probability estimates, 
confidence ratings, response times, and explicit awareness ratings.  In other words, the third 
section is a test of Hypothesis 2B that base-rate neglect and conflict effects in the base-rate task 
is a function of conflict resolution strategy. 
3.3.2. Probability estimates, confidence, and response times. 
3.3.2.1. Probability estimates. 
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For probability estimates, responses were rescaled so higher values corresponded to 
answers closer to the base-rate probability.  The probability estimate data were expected to 
replicate Experiment 1: estimates for congruent problems would be closer to the base-rate 
probability than estimates for incongruent problems.  Probability estimates for balanced 
problems were also expected to higher than for incongruent problems but lower than congruent 
problems.  As expected, the effect of congruency on probability estimates mirrored the pattern 
observed for the analogous conditions in Experiment 1, F(2,322)=257.01, p<.001, ηp2=0.62: 
estimates were closer to the base-rate probability for congruent trials (M=76.35, SD=13.89) than 
incongruent trials (M=42.07, SD=22.43; t(164)=19.7, p<.001) and were higher than for balanced 
trials (M=50.73, SD=7.95; t(163)=20.77, p<.001).  Balanced estimates were also higher than 
incongruent estimates (t(163)=4.82, p<.001).   
No main effect of explicit-awareness group was found, F(2,161)=1.4, p=.251, ηp2=0.02, 
but a Congruency x Explicit-Awareness group interaction was observed, F(3.43,276.27)=4.0, 
p=.006, ηp2=0.05.  The effect of congruency was analyzed within each explicit-awareness group; 
the data are presented in Table 3.2.   
 
Table 3.2. Mean probability estimates by congruency and explicit-awareness group. 
Congruency  Group  Mean  SD  N  
Incongruent   Control   36.32   22.865   52   
    Intervention   46.78   22.660   55   
    Dual-task  42.77   20.993   57   
Congruent   Control   79.53   13.244   52   
    Intervention   76.66   12.642   55   
    Dual-task  73.13   15.100   57   
Balanced   Control   50.16   8.484   52   
    Intervention   51.49   8.033   55   
    Dual-task  50.50   7.436   57   
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For the control group, the congruency effect was significant, F(2,102)=114.8, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.69; probability estimates differed between all the congruency conditions (ts(51)>4.18, 
ps<.001).  The effect of congruency was also significant in the intervention group, 
F(2,108)=64.61, p<.001, ηp2=0.55; probability estimates for congruent problems were closer to 
the base-rate probability than incongruent problems (t(55)=10.18, p<.001) and higher than 
probability estimates for balanced problems (t(54)=11.37, p<.001).  Probability estimates for 
incongruent and balanced problems did not differ (t(54)=1.46, p=.451).  In the dual-task group, 
there was also an effect of congruency, F(2,112)=80.0, p<.001, ηp2=0.59.  Probability estimates 
for congruent problems were closer to the base-rate probability than incongruent problems, 
higher than balanced problems, and balanced estimates were higher than incongruent estimate 
(ts(56)>2.82, ps<.021).   
A one-way ANOVA was calculated for each congruency condition.  The effect of 
explicit-awareness group was significant for incongruent problems, F(2,162)=3.46, p=.034, 
ηp2=0.04.  Overall, the control group gave probability estimates that were lower than the 
intervention group probability estimates (t(106)=2.62, p=.029).  Probability estimates in the dual-
task group did not differ from the control group (t(107)=1.5, p=.406) or the intervention group 
(t(111)=1.16, p=.748).  The explicit-awareness groups did not differ on probability estimates for 
balanced problems, F<1, or for congruent problems, F(2,162)=2.99, p=.053, ηp2=0.04. 
There was no a priori prediction for the effect of the explicit-awareness manipulation on 
probability estimates.  As the Congruency x Explicit-Awareness interaction did not interact with 
the block factor, F(3.88,311.99)=2.34, p=.057, ηp2=0.03, the effect of explicit-awareness group 
on probability estimates emerged in Block 1.  Potentially, this interaction is a Type I error, 
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explained by chance variance; there is no reason to expect the control and intervention groups to 
differ significantly in Block 1 where they complete the exact same task. 
3.3.2.2. Confidence. 
Confidence ratings were expected to replicate the results from Experiment 1, where 
confidence was rated as higher for congruent problems than incongruent problems.  Overall, a 
congruency effect was observed for confidence ratings, F(2,324)=7.1, p<.001, ηp2=0.04, where 
confidence for congruent trials (M=7.11, SD=0.99) was higher than confidence for incongruent 
trials (M=6.92, SD=1.05; t(164)=2.64, p=.028) and balanced trials (M=6.84, SD=1.03; 
t(164)=3.53, p=.002).  Confidence did not differ between incongruent and balanced trials 
(t(164)=1.09, p=.836).  Thus, the congruency effect for incongruent and congruent problems in 
Experiment 1 was replicated.  Notably, confidence on balanced problems was statistically 
equivalent to incongruent problems; it was the congruent problems where confidence was higher 
than the other congruency conditions. 
3.3.2.3. Response times. 
Response times were also expected to replicate the results from Experiment 1, where 
response times were longer for incongruent problems than for congruent problems.  The effect of 
congruency on response time was not significant, F(1.91,309.58)=1.19, p=.305, ηp2=0.01, but a 
Block x Congruency interaction was observed, F(2,324)=3.28, p=.039, ηp2=0.02.  The 
congruency effect was not found in Block 1 (F<1), but was present in Block 2, 
F(1.91,313.48)=4.86, p=.009, ηp2=0.03.  Overall, Block 2 response times for incongruent 
problems (M=12.16, SD=3.7) were longer than Block 2 congruent problem response times 
(M=11.58, SD=3.17; t(164)=3.24, p=.004); response times for balanced problems (M=12.01, 
SD=4.17) did not differ from congruent (t(164)=2.33, p=.063) nor incongruent problem response 
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times (t(164)=0.68, p>.999).  Consistent with the confidence data, balanced problem response 
times were similar to incongruent problem response times.  Also, response times were longer for 
incongruent problems than congruent problems but this effect only manifested in Block 2.  These 
results suggest that response time is not an effective index of conflict detection, as this effect 
would be expected to be present at the onset of the task, as well.   
An effect of block was found on response times, F(1,162)=77.11, p<.001, ηp2=0.32. 
Overall, responses were faster in Block 2 (M=11.92, SD=3.4) than in Block 1 (M=13.34, 
SD=3.65); reasoners tended to respond more quickly over time.  The block factor also interacted 
with explicit-awareness group, F(2,162)=4.04, p=.019, ηp2=0.05; the data are presented in Table 
3.3.  Response times in Block 1 for the intervention, dual-task, and control groups did not differ, 
F(2,162)=2.17, p=.117, ηp2=0.03.  In Block 2, the intervention, dual-task, and control groups also 
did not differ on response times, F(2,162)=1.19, p=.308, ηp2=0.01.  Each group gave faster 
responses in Block 2 than in Block 1: intervention (t(55)=5.1, p<.001), dual-task (t(56)=6.47, 
p<.001), and control (t(51)=4.17, p<.001) groups.  The interaction occurred because the response 
time decrease from Block 1 to Block 2 was smaller in the control group (-0.76) than the 
intervention (-1.81) and dual-task groups (-1.64).  
 
Table 3.3. Mean response times by block and explicit-awareness group. 
Block  Group  Mean (ms) SD  N  
Block 1   Control   12813   2248   52   
    Intervention   14146   4478   56   
    Dual-task  13015   3688   57   
Block 2   Control   12054   2058   52   
    Intervention   12336   4347   56   
    Dual-task  11379   3294   57   
 
3.3.3. Hypothesis 2A: Explicit awareness can be experimentally manipulated. 
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 All participants responded to a yes-no question regarding awareness of conflict.  There 
were 131 “yes” responses (79.4%), which was significantly higher than chance (tested against 
50%; t(165)=25.14, p<.001).  Participants in the intervention group also responded to this 
question between blocks.  There were 45 “yes” responses (80.4%) from a total of 56 responses; 
this value was also higher than chance (t(55)=15.0, p<.001).  Thus, a large majority of 
participants reported that they were aware that the ratios and descriptions suggested different 
responses; moreover, they were aware after Block 1 in the intervention group. 
 If a “yes” response was given, two further questions regarding explicit awareness were 
presented (this was also the case for the intervention group questionnaire between Block 1 and 
Block 2).  Consistent with Experiment 1, the end-task ratings of explicit awareness were high: 
Q1 (M=3.84, SD=1.29) and Q2 (M=3.74, SD=1.43).  The mid-task ratings in the intervention 
group were also high: Q1 (M=3.76, SD=1.43) and Q2 (M=3.96, SD=1.35).  Thus, a consistent 
and high proportion of reasoners reported awareness of the conflict. 
The primary goal of this experiment was to manipulate explicit awareness of conflict.  
The prediction was that the intervention group would report higher explicit awareness than the 
control group and the dual-task group would report lower explicit awareness than the control 
group.  The two end-task measures of explicit awareness were correlated with each other (ρ=.58, 
p<.001); the mid-task measures were also correlated with each other (ρ=.37, p=.014).  From 
these measures, composite mid- and end-task explicit awareness scores were computed.   
A one-way ANOVA of explicit awareness was calculated with end-task explicit 
awareness as the dependent variable.  Contrary to the prediction, this effect was not significant, 
F(2,128)=0.44, p=.646, ηp2=0.01.  Explicit awareness ratings did not differ between the 
intervention (M=3.92, SD=1.21), dual-task (M=3.78, SD=1.32), and control groups (M=3.68, 
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SD=1.09), suggesting that neither the intervention nor the dual-task impacted explicit awareness 
of conflict.  Additionally, in the intervention group, the mid-task and end-task scores were not 
different from each other (t(37)=0.15, p=.880).  This result was surprising, as the intervention 
was a blatant attempt to notify reasoners of the conflict in the problems.  In sum, the attempt to 
manipulate explicit awareness was unsuccessful (one potential explanation is offered below). 
3.3.4. Hypothesis 2B: The effects of resolution strategy will replicate. 
The secondary goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the strategy effects found in 
Experiment 1.  The distribution of strategy reports was similar to Experiment 1; in Experiment 2, 
32 participants reported using a Numbers strategy (19.4%), 78 participants reported a Sketches 
strategy (47.3%), and 55 participants reported a Cases strategy (33.3%).  Furthermore, these 
strategies were similarly distributed across the control, intervention, and dual-task groups, 
χ2(4,165)=3.14, p=.535.  As in Experiment 1, the majority of participants adopted a strategy to 
rely on the personality descriptions, which explained an overall base-rate neglect phenomenon 
when probability estimates were analyzed across all participants.  To test the effect of strategy, a 
3 (Congruency[incongruent, congruent, neutral]) x 2 (Block[Block 1, Block 2]) x 3 
(Strategy[Numbers, Sketches, Cases]) mixed-design ANOVA was computed on three dependent 
variables: probability estimates, confidence, and response times.   
3.3.4.1. Probability estimates. 
A robust effect of strategy on probability estimates was found in Experiment 1 and was 
expected to be replicated in Experiment 2.  The effect of strategy was significant, 
F(2,161)=22.24, p<.001, ηp2=0.22.  The Numbers group gave probability estimates higher 
(M=64.3, SD=11.11) than the Sketches group (M=51.48, SD=7.89; t(108)=6.08, p<.001).  The 
Cases group  (M=59.1, SD=10.55) also gave higher than the Sketches group (t(131)=4.65, 
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p<.001).  The Numbers and Cases groups did not differ on their probability estimates (t(85)=2.1, 
p=.111). 
A Congruency x Strategy interaction was found, F(4,322)=7.15, p<.001, ηp2=0.08.  The 
effect of strategy was interpreted by calculating a one-way ANOVA on probability estimates 
within each congruency condition (see Figure 3.2).  Based on Experiment 1, it was expected that 
the Numbers group would give responses closest to the base-rate probability and the Sketches 
group would provide responses furthest from the base-rate probability.  For incongruent 
problems, the effect of strategy was observed, F(2,162)=19.07, p<.001, ηp2=0.19.  Consistent 
with the coherence-resolution interpretation and replicating Experiment 1, the Numbers group 
(M=58.23, SD=22.96) gave estimates closer to the base-rate probability than the Sketches group 
(M=32.84, SD=17.18; t(108)=5.87, p<.001) and Cases group (M=46.72, SD=23.42; t(85)=2.51, 
p=.039), while the Cases group gave estimates closer to the base-rate probability than the 
Sketches group (t(131)=3.83, p<.001).  For congruent problems, the strategy effect was also 
significant, F(2,162)=6.69, p=.002, ηp2=0.08.  The Numbers group gave responses closer to the 
base-rate probability (M=81.59, SD=14.55) than the Sketches group (M=72.43, SD=13.37; 
t(108)=3.26, p=.004) and the Cases group (M=78.78, SD=12.74; t(85)=2.69, p=.023); the Cases 
and Sketches groups did not differ on congruent probability estimates (t(131)=0.94, p>.999).  For 
balanced problems, the strategy effect on probability estimates was not significant, F(2,161)=2.7, 
p=.071, ηp2=0.03.  The Numbers group (M=52.21, SD=6.42), the Sketches group (M=49.23, 
SD=8.83), and the Cases group probability estimates (M=52.01, SD=7.12) did not differ for 
balanced problems.  In sum, this pattern of data replicates the strategy effect on probability 
estimates from Experiment 1, but the effect also emerged for congruent problems. 
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Figure 3.2. Mean probability estimates for Experiment 2 as a function of Strategy x Congruency. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
3.3.4.2. Confidence. 
 There was evidence in Experiment 1 that the Sketches strategy group was less sensitive to 
conflict (as indexed by confidence) than the other strategy groups; participants who reported 
applying a Sketches strategy were more confident on conflict problems than participants who 
reported the Numbers and Cases strategies.  In Experiment 2, the effect of strategy on confidence 
was not significant, F<1, but there was a Congruency x Strategy interaction, F(4,324)=3.41, 
p=.01, ηp2=0.04 (see Figure 3.3).  To decompose this interaction, a one-way ANOVA was 
calculated within each congruency condition for the explicit-awareness group factor. 
 Contrary to the prediction, for incongruent problems, the effect of strategy was not 
significant, F<1; the Numbers group (M=6.89, SD=1.02), Sketches group (M=7.02, SD=1.01) 
and Cases group (M=6.78, SD=1.11) did not differ on their confidence reports for incongruent 
problems.  In the congruent condition, there also was no effect of strategy, F(2,162)=1.03, 
p=.361, ηp2=0.01.  Confidence reported for congruent problems by the Numbers group (M=7.14, 
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SD=1.16) did not differ from confidence reported by the Sketches group (M=7.0, SD=0.95) or 
the Cases group (M=7.25, SD=0.94); the Sketches and Cases groups also did not differ on 
reported confidence for congruent problems.  The strategy effect was also not significant in the 
balanced condition, F(2,162)=1.16, p=.318, ηp2=0.01.  For balanced problems, confidence 
reported by the Numbers group (M=6.64, SD=0.98) did not differ from the Sketches group 
(M=6.96, SD=1.0) or the Cases group (M=6.8, SD=1.11); the Sketches and Cases groups also did 
not differ on confidence for balanced problems.   
 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean confidence ratings for Experiment 2 as a function of Strategy x Congruency. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
The interaction occurred because the effect of congruency differed between the strategy 
groups.  In the Cases group, the effect of congruency was significant, F(2,108)=10.01, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.16.  Confidence was higher for congruent problems than incongruent problems 
(t(54)=4.05, p<.001) and balanced problems (t(54)=3.49, p=.003), but incongruent and balanced 
problem confidence did not differ (t(54)=0.21, p>.999).  In the Sketches group, the effect of 
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congruency was not significant, F<1.  For the Numbers group, the effect of congruency was 
significant, F(2,62)=3.45, p=.038, ηp2=0.1, but pairwise comparisons found no differences in 
confidence between any of the congruency conditions (ts(31)<2.51, ps>.052).  Thus, the 
expected effect of conflict only manifested for those who reported a Cases strategy, suggesting 
that confidence as an index of conflict detection is sensitive to the resolution strategy adopted by 
the reasoner. 
3.3.4.3. Response time. 
 It was predicted that the Cases group would take the longest to respond.  Instead, 
response times did not differ across strategy groups, F(2,162)=1.15, p=.319, ηp2=0.01.  The 
Numbers group (M=12.43, SD=2.05), Sketches group (M=13.24, SD=4.21), and Cases group 
(M=12.2, SD=3.36) did not differ on response times.   
3.3.4.4. Explicit Awareness. 
 In Experiment 1, the Cases group had the highest explicit awareness ratings and the 
Sketches group had the lowest explicit awareness ratings.  However, in Experiment 2, the effect 
of strategy on explicit awareness was not significant, F(2,128)=2.32, p=.102, ηp2=0.04.  Explicit 
awareness reported by the Numbers group (M=3.35, SD=1.2), the Sketches group (M=3.8, 
SD=1.19), and the Cases group (M=3.99, SD=1.19) did not differ. 
3.4. Discussion 
Experiment 2 was designed to influence explicit awareness of conflict by (a) increasing 
awareness with direct queries to draw the attention of the reasoner to the conflict and (b) 
decreasing awareness with a concurrent working-memory task.  The experimental manipulation 
was unsuccessful.  This result was especially surprising regarding the intervention; alerting 
reasoners to the conflict had no effect on their awareness.  One reasonable interpretation of these 
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data is that influencing explicit awareness of conflict is difficult because reasoners are already 
highly aware of the conflict.  A large majority of participants reported being aware of the conflict 
and overall, explicit awareness ratings were high in Experiment 2 (replicating Experiment 1). 
The replication of the effect of conflict resolution strategy from Experiment 1 was 
achieved in Experiment 2: conflict resolution strategy was predictive of probability estimates.  
Additionally, the proportion of reasoners reporting each strategy was consistent in each 
experiment.  These data suggest that base-rate neglect is a function of strategy.  For congruent 
and incongruent problems, reasoners who reported relying on the base-rate ratios to inform their 
decisions provided probability estimates closest to the base-rate ratios.  For incongruent 
problems, those who reported reliance upon the personality sketches give probability estimates 
furthest from the base-rate ratios7.  Additionally, the hallmark conflict detection effect on 
confidence (lower confidence for incongruent problems relative to congruent problems) was only 
found for reasoners who reported a Cases strategy, suggesting that sensitivity to conflict (as 
indexed by confidence) is a function of the conflict resolution strategy adopted by the reasoner to 
solve the problem. 
Chapter 4. General Discussion 
 The central claim of the conflict detection literature is that detection is processed 
implicitly and thus, reasoners are relatively unaware of the conflict (De Neys, 2012; 2014).  The 
two experiments in the present thesis provide new and compelling evidence that reasoners 
demonstrate explicit awareness of conflict and that the primary behavioural measures used to 
evince detection of conflict are indexing more than the conflict detection process per se.  In 
Experiment 1, the patterns of response times, fixation times, and confidence were more 
                                                             
7 The effect of Strategy was robust in each sample taken for Experiment 2. 
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consistent with a coherence-resolution interpretation of these indices than a conflict-detection 
interpretation.  Response times were longer for neutral problems than conflict and non-conflict 
problems, suggesting that response time as an index is sensitive to other processes than conflict 
detection (i.e., the resolution of conflict).  Fixation times were not sensitive to conflict; there 
were no differences between the conflict and non-conflict problems regarding fixation times.  
Instead, fixation times were longest for neutral problems on both the base-rate ratios and 
personality descriptions.  The extra time spent on neutral problems appears to be spent 
evaluating both the base-rate ratios and personality descriptions.  In other words, contrary to the 
conflict detection interpretation, response times and fixation times are most sensitive to the 
neutral problems, not the conflict in the incongruent problems. 
Confidence ratings were more consistent with an effect of coherence monitoring (Koriat, 
2012) than a conflict-detection interpretation (De Neys, 2014).  Under the conflict-detection 
interpretation, confidence would be expected to be rated lowest for the problems with the highest 
degree of conflict.  Two results contradicted this prediction.  First, confidence was lowest for 
neutral problems, not the conflict problems.  Second, confidence was not sensitive to the 
extremity of the base-rate ratios (i.e., the degree of conflict between ratios and descriptions) for 
conflict problems but was sensitive to the extremity of the ratios for the non-conflict congruent 
problems.  These data are difficult to reconcile with the conflict-detection interpretation.  The 
relative coherence of the information presented to the reasoner appears to better account for these 
confidence data than the presence of conflicting responses to the problem. 
Across both experiments, self-reported resolution strategies were robustly associated with 
probability estimates.  These data suggest that base-rate neglect is a function of the strategic 
approach to resolve the conflict and the measures intended to index detection of conflict are also 
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indexing conflict resolution strategy.  Also, in two experiments, reasoners reported high explicit 
awareness of conflict.  There is reason to trust these self-reports.  Reasoner’s retrospective 
reports on their resolution strategy mapped sensibly on to a host of behavioural measures: 
probability estimates, confidence ratings, response times, and fixation times.  It is reasonable to 
suggest that the lack of correlation between the so-called implicit measures of conflict detection 
(confidence ratings, response times, and fixation times) and the novel self-reports of explicit 
conflict awareness indicates that they are indexing different cognitive factors, namely, measures 
of the explicit awareness of conflict and measures that index multiple processes: coherence 
monitoring, conflict detection, and conflict resolution. 
4.1. Base-Rate Neglect and Conflict Resolution Strategy 
 The typical base-rate neglect phenomenon was replicated in both experiments: 
probability estimates were further from the base-rate probability for conflict problems than non-
conflict problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Newman et al., 2017; Pennycook & Thompson, 
2012; Thompson et al., 2011).  The pattern of probability estimates for neutral personality 
descriptions (Newman et al., 2017) was also replicated: estimates for neutral problems were 
closer to the base-rate probability and further from the base-rate probability than estimates for 
conflict and non-conflict problems, respectively.   
 The base-rate neglect phenomenon in these experiments appeared to be a function of 
conflict resolution strategy.  In both experiments, a robust effect of the self-reported strategy was 
found: reasoners who reported relying on the base-rate ratios gave responses closest to the base-
rate probability and reasoners who reported relying on the personality descriptions gave 
responses furthest from the base-rate probability.  Moreover, a consistent proportion of reasoners 
reported adopting each of the strategy options in both experiments: approximately 20% of 
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reasoners relied on the ratios, 45% relied on the descriptions, and 35% took a case-by-case 
approach.  This distribution of strategies is consistent with the position that base-rate neglect 
occurs because reasoners who resolve conflict in favour of the personality descriptions 
outnumber reasoners who resolve conflict in favour of the base-rate probability (Newman et al., 
2017; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012).  In sum, these data suggest that the base-rate task is 
fundamentally a task that assesses conflict resolution preferences, not a uniform inability to 
recognize and avoid a compelling lure (i.e., the stereotypical personality description). 
4.2. Behavioural Indices are Sensitive to Multiple Factors 
 The typical effects of conflict were replicated in two experiments: reasoners were less 
confident and took longer to respond when solving conflict problems relative to non-conflict 
congruent problems.  A crucial test of the conflict-detection and coherence-resolution 
interpretations were the response times, fixation times, and confidence ratings for neutral 
problems in Experiment 1.  Neutral problems are also non-conflict problems.  Therefore, the 
conflict-detection and coherence-resolution interpretations made different predictions on how the 
presumed indices of conflict detection would manifest for the neutral problems relative to the 
conflict problems.  For each of the measures (response times, fixation times, and confidence), the 
evidence was clear: the hallmark indicators of the detection of conflict (reduced confidence, 
longer response times, longer fixation times) were even more pronounced for neutral problems 
than for incongruent conflict problems (see Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8).   
The predominant interpretation is that differences between congruent and incongruent 
problems are an effect of conflict detection (De Neys, 2014).  If this is the case, then how can a 
larger conflict detection effect occur between congruent and neutral problems than congruent and 
incongruent problems?  The neutral problem data is inconsistent with the conflict-detection 
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interpretation.  From these data, we can conclude that these measures index something else 
beyond conflict detection.  Possibilities include the resolution of conflict, indecision or 
uncertainty, or relative coherence of the information.  For example, monitoring of coherence can 
influence fluency (Koriat, 2012), which in turn impacts response times and confidence 
(Topolinski, 2011).  Another possibility is that uninformative neutral problems are interpreted as 
especially odd by reasoners, effectively slowing down their reasoning and increasing their 
uncertainty.  These indices are likely sensitive to multiple cognitive factors, some of which can 
also elicit behavioural responses that mirror the presumed effects of conflict detection.  If a 
measure indexes multiple cognitive factors, it is no longer warranted to infer from the effect 
(e.g., reduced confidence for conflict problems) to the cause (e.g., conflict detection) because 
there are multiple potential causes.  Considering the present evidence, the logic of the conflict-
detection interpretation is less sound. 
The difference on behavioural indices between conflict and non-conflict problems may 
represent two separate dimensions: a conflict effect for incongruent problems and a coherence 
effect for congruent problems (Koriat, 2012).  If this is the case, then when a difference is 
recorded between conflict and non-conflict problems, how can one discriminate whether the 
observed effect was present in one condition, the other condition, or both conditions?  
In Experiment 1, there was evidence that the typical “conflict” effect on confidence was a 
decrease in confidence for conflict problems.  Rather than attributing the difference to the 
presence of conflict, it might have something to do with the coherence of the information.  There 
was no effect of extremity for the incongruent problems but there was an effect of extremity for 
the congruent problems; this is inconsistent with the conflict-detection interpretation.  This 
evidence suggests that the conflict effect is not due to relatively lower confidence in the presence 
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of conflict, but rather, relatively higher confidence in the presence of coherent information.  
Moreover, the conflict effect did not differ as a function of the degree of conflict between the 
base-rate ratio and personality description.  Instead, it was observed that confidence increased for 
congruent problems as a function of the consistency of the evidence (i.e., the interaction of 
congruency and extremity). 
These data suggest that much of the evidence in support of the conflict-detection 
interpretation (De Neys, 2014) hinges upon behavioural measures that are sensitive to more than 
just detection of conflict.  Previously, much of the conflict detection evidence has been lumped 
together as a long list of behavioural indicators (such as response times, confidence, fixation 
times, and others) that differentiate congruent and incongruent problems (see De Neys, 2014).  
Implicit in this claim is the assumption that these measures all index the same underlying 
cognitive process.  Our data challenge this assumption.  Instead, these measures should be 
discriminated based on the aspects of conflict detection, resolution, and coherence monitoring 
processes that they index.  This research is a first step towards determining where these measures 
converge and where they diverge. 
4.3. Explicit Awareness of Conflict 
 One of the primary hypotheses tested in this research was whether reasoners are 
explicitly aware of conflict.  The prediction was that reasoners are more aware than previously 
assumed by the conflict-detection interpretation.  There was evidence to support that claim: 
reasoners reported high awareness of conflict (on a scale from 1 to 7) in both Experiment 1 
(M=4.14, SD=0.98) and Experiment 2 (M=3.79, SD=1.2).  Additionally, a large majority of 
reasoners in Experiment 2 responded “yes” to a yes-no question of their awareness of competing 
80 
responses (approximately 80%).  Therefore, reasoners appeared to be relatively aware of the 
conflict, explicitly.  
The retrospective strategy reports taken were phrased to determine the information a 
reasoner relies upon to reach their probability estimates.  In other words, it is a question of how 
one resolved the conflict, not how one may or may not have identified the conflict.  The strategy 
reports were robustly associated with a variety of behavioural measures that supported their 
validity.  Therefore, this measure was an accurate assessment of conflict resolution strategy. 
 The strategy reports demonstrated how resolution strategy affected the supposed implicit 
measures of conflict detection.  In Experiment 1, reasoners who applied a Sketches strategy 
reported higher confidence on conflict problems than those who reported a Numbers or Cases 
strategy.  The Sketches strategy group may be confident when they can resolve the conflict in 
favour of their preferred source of information: the personality descriptions.  Notably, this effect 
was absent in Experiment 2; perhaps this effect of strategy is contextual, dependent on the 
presence of neutral problems in the task.  Additionally, the reasoners who reported a Cases 
strategy displayed longer response times than the other strategies.  It may be that the strategy that 
weights the probabilistic and stereotypical information more equally required a longer time to 
resolve the conflict between said information. 
 Clearly, these measures are sensitive to how a reasoner resolves the conflict in the 
problems.  Even if these measures were sensitive to an implicit process of conflict detection, they 
are also indexing the resolution of that conflict.  Thus, when the hallmark indicators of supposed 
conflict detection are observed (e.g., reduced confidence, longer response time), it is unclear 
what the underlying cognitive processes were to elicit those behaviours.   
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 Ultimately, measures that index conflict resolution processes would likely not be 
correlated with awareness of the conflict itself.  Explicit awareness of conflict is a measure of 
how aware a reasoner was that there was some degree of inconsistency in the problem or that 
there were competing responses available.  Measures such as confidence and response times 
appear to be sensitive to what the reasoner does once they are aware of the conflict.  
Additionally, there are clear individual differences in resolution strategy: the distribution of 
strategies reported is not uniform and reported strategy is predictive of performance on the base-
rate task.  Thus, it is not surprising that awareness was not correlated with the typical measures 
of conflict detection. 
 The attempt to increase and decrease explicit awareness of conflict in Experiment 2 
failed.  In retrospect, there is a straightforward explanation for this outcome: reasoners were 
already aware of the conflict.  If so, it would be difficult to either prevent or facilitate detection 
of the conflict.  These data suggest that reasoners are explicitly aware of the conflict during 
problem solving, but differ considerably on how they react to and resolve the conflict.  Moving 
forward, efforts to develop more nuanced measures are required.  Identifying new paradigms that 
allow for per-trial measures of explicit awareness and resolution strategy are needed.   
4.4. Conclusion 
 The evidence gathered here provided a strong challenge to the prevailing conflict-
detection interpretation, suggesting that reasoners are explicitly aware of conflict but they differ 
on their resolution of said conflict.  The data are consistent with the conclusion that the typical 
indices of conflict detection are sensitive to conflict resolution and coherence monitoring 
processes.  The conflict detection literature implies a flawed reasoning process: detecting conflict 
is an indicator that something is amiss in the information presented and failing to resolve it in 
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favour of the statistically or logically correct response is an error.  I have argued here for a more 
positive position: it is the subjective evaluation of the evidence to reach a self-consistent 
conclusion that drives what have been considered “conflict” effects.  Current reasoning theories 
need to move from the poorly specified conflict detection stage toward a broader view that can 
account for the advantageous recognition of coherent information and resolution of uncertainty. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
To change an incongruent problem to congruent (or vice versa), reverse the values in the base-
rate.  For example, the incongruent problem Q1H has 5 engineers and 995 lawyers and the 
description of Jack fits the stereotype of an engineer (incongruent).  To change the problem to 
congruent, change the base-rate ratio to 995 engineers and 5 lawyers.  Neutral problems are 
neither congruent nor incongruent. 
 
Incongruent Problems 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 5 engineers and 995 
lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jack is 36 years old.  He is not 
married and is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction and 
writing computer programs. What is the probability that Jack is a lawyer? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 300 men and 700 women. 
Jessie is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jessie is 23 years old and is finishing a 
degree in engineering. On Friday nights, Jessie likes to go out cruising with friends while 
listening to loud music and drinking beer. What is the probability that Jessie is a man? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 470 who live in a condo 
and 530 who live in a farmhouse.  Kurt is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Kurt 
works on Wall Street and is single. He works long hours and wears Armani suits to work. He 
likes wearing shades.  What is the probability that Kurt lives in a farmhouse? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 996 nurses and 4 doctors. 
Paul is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Paul is 34 years old.  He lives in a beautiful 
home in a posh suburb. He is well spoken and very interested in politics. He invests a lot of time 
in his career.  What is the probability that Paul is a doctor? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 290 whose favorite series 
is Star Trek and 710 whose favorite series is Days of Our Lives. Jeremy is a randomly chosen 
participant of this study. Jeremy is 26 and is doing graduate studies in physics. He stays at home 
most of the time and likes to play video-games. What is the probability that Jeremy’s favorite 
series is Days of Our Lives? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 480 sixteen- year olds and 
520 fifty-year olds. Ellen is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Ellen likes to listen to 
hip hop and rap music. She enjoys wearing tight shirts and jeans. She’s fond of dancing and has a 
small nose piercing.  What is the probability that Ellen is sixteen? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 3 accountants and 997 
street artists. Brannon is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Brannon is 29 years old. He 
is very good with numbers but is shy around people. He spends much of his time working. What 
is the probability that Brannon is an accountant? 
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In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 280 writers and 720 
construction workers. Hank is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Hank is 42 years old. 
He is a creative and introverted person. He considers his home computer his most prized 
possession. What is the probability that Hank is a writer? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 510 managers and 490 
firemen. Tyrone is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Tyrone is 27 years old. All his 
friends consider him very brave and he is in relatively good physical shape. He goes to the gym 
regularly. What is the probability that Tyrone is a manager? 
 
Congruent Problems 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 995 who buy their clothes 
at high-end retailers and 5 who buy their clothes at Wal-Mart. Karen is a randomly chosen 
participant of this study. Karen is a 33-year-old female. She works in a business office and drives 
a Porsche. She lives in a fancy penthouse with her boyfriend. What is the probability that Karen 
buys her clothes at Wal-Mart? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 700 girls and 300 boys. 
Kelly is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Kelly is 13 years old. Kelly’s favourite 
subject is art. Kelly’s favourite things to do are shopping and having sleepovers with friends to 
gossip about other kids at school. What is the probability that Kelly is a boy? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 530 who have a tattoo and 
470 without tattoo. Jay is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jay is a 29-year-old male. 
He has served a short time in prison. He has been living on his own for 2 years now. He has an 
older car and listens to punk music. What is the probability that Jay has a tattoo? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 996 kindergarten teachers 
and 4 executive managers. Lilly is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Lilly is 37 years 
old. She is married and has 3 kids. Her husband is a veterinarian.  She is committed to her family 
and always watches the daily cartoon shows with her kids. What is the probability that Lilly is a 
kindergarten teacher? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 290 Bruce Springsteen 
fans and 710 Britney Spears fans. Tara is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Tara is 15. 
She loves to go shopping at the mall and to talk with her friends about their crushes at school. 
What is the probability that Tara is a Bruce Springsteen fan?  
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 480 Americans and 520 
French people. Martine is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Martine is 26 years old. 
She is bilingual and reads a lot in her spare time. She is a very fashionable dresser and a great 
cook.  What is the probability that Martine is French? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 997 aeroplane pilots and 
3 shop assistants. George is a randomly chosen participant of this study. George is 36 years old. 
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He is very intelligent and has nerves of steel. He has great hand-eye coordination. What is the 
probability that George is a shop assistant? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 280   I.T. Technicians and 
720 politicians. Richard is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Richard is 38 years old. 
He is a good public speaker and is good at meeting people. He is a top notch debater and can 
argue both sides of an issue with ease.  What is the probability that Richard is a politician? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 510 paramedics and 490 
clowns. Dan is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Dan is 30 years old. He is a good 
driver and a takes his job very seriously. He is married, but has no children. What is the 
probability that Dan is a clown? 
 
Neutral Problems 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 5 who campaigned for 
George W. Bush and 995 who campaigned for John Kerry. Jim is a randomly chosen participant 
of this study.  Jim is 5 ft and 8 in. tall, has black hair, and is the father of two young girls. He 
drives a yellow van that is completely covered with campaign posters. What is the probability 
that Jim campaigned for John Kerry? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested.  Among the participants there were 700 men and 300 
women. Casey is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Casey is a 36-year-old writer.  
Casey has two brothers and one sister. Casey likes running and watching a good movie.  What is 
the probability that Casey is a woman? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 470 who play the drums 
and 530 who play the saxophone. Tom is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Tom is 20 
years old. He is studying in Washington and has no steady girlfriend.  He just bought a second-
hand car with his savings.  What is the probability that Tom plays the drums? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 996 pool players and 4 
basketball players.  Jason is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Jason is 29 years old 
and has lived his whole life in New York. He has green colored eyes and black hair. He drives a 
light-gray colored car.  What is the probability that Jason is a basketball player?   
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 290 who live in New 
York and 710 who live in Los Angeles.  Christopher is a randomly chosen participant of this 
study. Christopher is 28 years old. He has a girlfriend and shares an apartment with a friend. He 
likes watching basketball.  What is the probability that Christopher lives in Los Angeles? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 480 computer science 
majors and 520 English majors. Matt is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Matt is 20 
years old and lives in downtown Toronto. Matt’s favourite food is pasta with meatballs. His 
parents are living in Vancouver. What is the probability that Matt is a computer science major? 
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In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 997 blondes and 3 
brunettes.  Geraldine is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Geraldine is 41 years old. 
She loves a good movie and spends a lot of her free time reading.  She enjoys helping her two 
children with their homework.  What is the probability that Geraldine is a brunette? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 720 bookkeepers and 280 
bank tellers. Dianna is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Dianna is 59 years old.  She 
has been employed at her current job for 7 years. She recently took a holiday to visit with family 
and friends.  What is the probability that Dianna is a bookkeeper? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested.  Among the participants there were 510 teachers and 490 
secretaries.  Molly is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Molly is 25 years old.   She 
drives a mid-sized car and lunches in the cafeteria twice a week.  She enjoys hiking and dancing.  
What is the probability that Molly is a secretary? 
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Appendix B 
 
Q1 
Which of the following describes how you answered the questions: 
1. I mostly relied on the numbers 
2. I mostly paid attention to the personality sketches 
3. I guessed randomly 
4. I evaluated each problem on a case-by-case basis 
 If so, what was your criterion? Enter in the text box below 
5. None of the above. 
 Please describe in the text box below 
Please enter a number 1-5 to select your response.   
If you select 4 or 5, please enter additional text in the box provided below. 
Press TAB on the keyboard to complete the question. 
 
Q2 
Did you feel that there was two (or more) answers, which were quite different from one another, 
to some of the problems? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Never         Sometimes        Frequently        Always 
 
Q3 
Was the following occupation described in the problems that you just solved? 
[Occupation] 
Yes - Y              No - N 
-librarian 
-doctor 
-professor 
-accountant 
-cashier 
-politician 
 
Q4 
Please estimate how long it took you to complete all 27 problems, from start to finish, then press 
ENTER: 
 
Q5 
Did you notice that sometimes the personality sketch and the numbers suggested different 
responses? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Never         Sometimes        Frequently        Always 
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Q6 
Was the following value amongst the sample sizes described in the problems that you just 
solved? 
[Sample] 
Yes - Y              No - N 
-900 
-330 
-490 
-700 
-997 
-500 
 
Q7 
Did you ever feel torn between two choices and needed to decide which you felt was a better 
solution? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Never         Sometimes        Frequently        Always 
 
 
Q8 
How did you answer the questions when you noticed that the personality sketch and  
the numbers suggested different responses or where you felt torn between two choices?   
Please enter your response in the text box below, and press TAB to finish. 
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Appendix C 
 
In a big research project a number of studies were carried out where short personality 
descriptions of the participants were made. In every study there were participants from two 
population groups (e.g., carpenters and policemen). In each study one participant was drawn at 
random from the sample. You will see the personality description of this randomly chosen 
participant. You will also get information about the composition of the population groups tested 
in the study of question. 
 
For each problem you'll be asked to provide us with a probability judgment out of 100, indicating 
what you believe the likelihood is that the randomly chosen participant belongs to the specified 
group.  
 
For example, if you are sure that the participant belongs to the specified group, you should 
choose a number closer to 100. Conversely, if you are sure that the participant does not belong to 
the specified group, you should choose a number closer to 0. Finally, if you are unsure about 
which group the participant belongs to, then you should choose a number close to 50.  
 
For all problems, the group that you are asked to give the probability for was randomly chosen 
out of the two groups presented. 
 
For each problem, we want you to provide two answers. For the first answer, we are interested in 
the answer that is your FIRST INCLINATION or INSTINCT. Thus, as soon as you have read 
the problem, please provide us with the FIRST ANSWER that comes to mind. It is important that 
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you try to answer as quickly as possible, as you will only have 12 seconds in which to provide 
your answer. Once 12 seconds has elapsed the problem will become italicized and change color.  
At this point you must enter your answer IMMEDIATELY if you have not yet done so. For this 
answer you will not be allowed to change your response once given. 
 
Your second answer should be your FINAL ANSWER. For this answer you will have as much 
time as you like to answer. Please make sure that you take your time and think about the problem 
carefully. At this point, you will be able to make changes to your answer if necessary. 
 
After each response, you will be asked to rate how confident you are with your response. For 
your first answer this scale will measure how ‘right' you feel about the answer. 1 will correspond 
with "doesn't feel right at all" and 9 will correspond with "feels very right".  
 
For your second answer, this scale will measure how confident you are with your final answer. 1 
will correspond with "not at all confident" and 9 will correspond with "extremely confident".  
 
Once you have provided a response, you will have a couple of seconds before the next problem 
will appear on the screen. 
 
Please feel free to ask any questions that you have. 
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Appendix D 
To change an incongruent problem to congruent (or vice versa), reverse the values in the base-
rate.  For example, the first incongruent problem has 5 engineers and 995 lawyers and the 
description of Jack fits the stereotype of an engineer (incongruent).  To change the problem to 
congruent, change the base-rate ratio to 995 engineers and 5 lawyers.  To change any of the 
problems to balanced problems, change the base-rate ratio to values close to 50:50 (e.g., 
520:480). 
 
Problems 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 5 engineers and 995 
lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jack is 36 years old.  He is not 
married and is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science fiction and 
writing computer programs. What is the probability that Jack is a lawyer? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 300 men and 700 women. 
Jessie is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jessie is 23 years old and is finishing a 
degree in engineering. On Friday nights, Jessie likes to go out cruising with friends while 
listening to loud music and drinking beer. What is the probability that Jessie is a man? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 470 who live in a condo 
and 530 who live in a farmhouse.  Kurt is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Kurt 
works on Wall Street and is single. He works long hours and wears Armani suits to work. He 
likes wearing shades.  What is the probability that Kurt lives in a farmhouse? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 996 nurses and 4 doctors. 
Paul is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Paul is 34 years old.  He lives in a beautiful 
home in a posh suburb. He is well spoken and very interested in politics. He invests a lot of time 
in his career.  What is the probability that Paul is a doctor? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 290 whose favorite series 
is Star Trek and 710 whose favorite series is Days of Our Lives. Jeremy is a randomly chosen 
participant of this study. Jeremy is 26 and is doing graduate studies in physics. He stays at home 
most of the time and likes to play video-games. What is the probability that Jeremy’s favorite 
series is Days of Our Lives? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 480 sixteen- year olds and 
520 fifty-year olds. Ellen is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Ellen likes to listen to 
hip hop and rap music. She enjoys wearing tight shirts and jeans. She’s fond of dancing and has a 
small nose piercing.  What is the probability that Ellen is sixteen? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 3 accountants and 997 
street artists. Brannon is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Brannon is 29 years old. He 
is very good with numbers but is shy around people. He spends much of his time working. What 
is the probability that Brannon is an accountant? 
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In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 280 writers and 720 
construction workers. Hank is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Hank is 42 years old. 
He is a creative and introverted person. He considers his home computer his most prized 
possession. What is the probability that Hank is a writer? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 510 managers and 490 
firemen. Tyrone is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Tyrone is 27 years old. All his 
friends consider him very brave and he is in relatively good physical shape. He goes to the gym 
regularly. What is the probability that Tyrone is a manager? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 995 who buy their clothes 
at high-end retailers and 5 who buy their clothes at Wal-Mart. Karen is a randomly chosen 
participant of this study. Karen is a 33-year-old female. She works in a business office and drives 
a Porsche. She lives in a fancy penthouse with her boyfriend. What is the probability that Karen 
buys her clothes at Wal-Mart? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 700 girls and 300 boys. 
Kelly is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Kelly is 13 years old. Kelly’s favourite 
subject is art. Kelly’s favourite things to do are shopping and having sleepovers with friends to 
gossip about other kids at school. What is the probability that Kelly is a boy? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 530 who have a tattoo and 
470 without tattoo. Jay is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jay is a 29-year-old male. 
He has served a short time in prison. He has been living on his own for 2 years now. He has an 
older car and listens to punk music. What is the probability that Jay has a tattoo? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 996 kindergarten teachers 
and 4 executive managers. Lilly is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Lilly is 37 years 
old. She is married and has 3 kids. Her husband is a veterinarian.  She is committed to her family 
and always watches the daily cartoon shows with her kids. What is the probability that Lilly is a 
kindergarten teacher? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 290 Bruce Springsteen 
fans and 710 Britney Spears fans. Tara is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Tara is 15. 
She loves to go shopping at the mall and to talk with her friends about their crushes at school. 
What is the probability that Tara is a Bruce Springsteen fan?  
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 480 Americans and 520 
French people. Martine is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Martine is 26 years old. 
She is bilingual and reads a lot in her spare time. She is a very fashionable dresser and a great 
cook.  What is the probability that Martine is French? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 997 aeroplane pilots and 
3 shop assistants. George is a randomly chosen participant of this study. George is 36 years old. 
He is very intelligent and has nerves of steel. He has great hand-eye coordination. What is the 
probability that George is a shop assistant? 
99 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 280   I.T. Technicians and 
720 politicians. Richard is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Richard is 38 years old. 
He is a good public speaker and is good at meeting people. He is a top notch debater and can 
argue both sides of an issue with ease.  What is the probability that Richard is a politician? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 510 paramedics and 490 
clowns. Dan is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Dan is 30 years old. He is a good 
driver and a takes his job very seriously. He is married, but has no children. What is the 
probability that Dan is a clown? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 997 blondes and 3 
brunettes.  Geraldine is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Geraldine is 41 years old. 
She loves a good movie and spends a lot of her free time reading.  She enjoys helping her two 
children with their homework.  What is the probability that Geraldine is a brunette? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 720 bookkeepers and 280 
bank tellers. Dianna is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Dianna is 59 years old.  She 
has been employed at her current job for 7 years. She recently took a holiday to visit with family 
and friends.  What is the probability that Dianna is a bookkeeper? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested.  Among the participants there were 510 teachers and 490 
secretaries.  Molly is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Molly is 25 years old.   She 
drives a mid-sized car and lunches in the cafeteria twice a week.  She enjoys hiking and dancing.  
What is the probability that Molly is a secretary? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Lucius is a randomly chosen participant of this study. 
Among the participants there were 530 hippies and 470 boxers. Lucius is 34 years old. He is 
pretty aggressive and tends to get involved in bar fights more than the average person. He 
recently got divorced. What is the probability that Lucius is a boxer? 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Floyd is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Among 
the participants there were 997 artists and 3 consultants. Floyd 40 years old. He is an imaginative 
person and enjoys street theatre. He loves experimenting with different types of food. What is the 
probability that Floyd is an artist? 
  
In a study 1000 people were tested. Corinne is a randomly chosen participant of this study. 
Among the participants there were 490 gardeners and 510 secretaries. Corinne is 32 years old. 
She is a great organizer and always dresses neatly. She loves talking to her friends and family on 
the phone. What is the probability that Corinne is a secretary? 
 
 
 
 
 
